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The Cost of Climate Policy in the United States 
Sergey Paltsev†, John M. Reilly, Henry D. Jacoby and Jennifer F. Morris 
Abstract 
We consider the cost of meeting emissions reduction targets consistent with a G8 proposal of a 50 
percent global reduction in emissions by 2050, and an Obama Administration proposal of an 80 
percent reduction over this period. We apply the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis 
(EPPA), modeling these two policy scenarios if met by applying a national cap-and-trade system, and 
compare results with an earlier EPPA analysis of reductions of this stringency. We also test results to 
alternative assumptions about program coverage, banking behavior, and cost of technology in the 
electric power sector. Two main messages emerge from the exercise. First, technology uncertainties 
have a huge effect on the generation mix but only a moderate effect on the emissions price and 
welfare cost of achieving the assumed targets. Measured in terms of changes in economic welfare, the 
economic cost of 80 percent reduction by 2050 is in the range of 2 to 3% by 2050, with CO2 prices 
between $48 and $67 in 2015 rising to between $190 and $266 by 2050. Second, implementation 
matters. When an idealized economy-wide cap-and-trade is replaced by coverage omitting some 
sectors, or if the credibility of long-term target is weak (limiting banking behavior) prices and welfare 
costs change substantially.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Several Congressional proposals for mitigating U.S. greenhouse gases have been put forth in 
recent years.  Paltsev et al. (2008) analyzed the main proposals for cap-and-trade systems and 
Metcalf et al. (2008) did the same for CO2 taxes.  Paltsev et al. (2008) developed three paths of 
emissions control spanning the range of Congressional proposals, summarized in terms of the 
number of allowances that would be issued between 2012 and 2050, defined in terms of billions 
of metric tons (bmt) of CO2 equivalent (CO2-e). The three cases—287, 203, and 167 bmt—were 
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associated with allowance allocation schemes that, respectively, yielded constant emissions at 
2008 levels or linearly reduced them to 50% and 80% below 2008 emissions by 2050. These 
target reductions, particularly those with deeper cuts, remain relevant to current policy 
discussions, but much has changed since our earlier work was completed. Here we reconsider 
these reduction targets using the same version of the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis 
(EPPA) model used by Patsev et al. (2008), but updating the underlying economic, technology, 
and policy assumptions to better reflect the current economic conditions and technology cost 
expectations.  
In terms of economic outlook, the prospects for economic growth have worsened, especially 
in the short term, and even the long-term growth prospects considered reasonable a few years 
ago now seem optimistic.  Lower economic activity means fewer emissions, and so less 
abatement will be needed to meet specific quantitative targets.   
On the technology front, the prospects for carbon capture and storage (CCS) have worsened: 
progress in commercial demonstration has been slow, and the full cost of the technology has 
become clearer as these efforts have proceeded.  As a result, costs are likely much higher than 
those drawn from earlier engineering studies and applied in our previous analysis. The prospects 
for nuclear power have changed as well.  There are now some concrete proposals within the U.S. 
to build new plants, even though the technology remains an inexpensive option. In the Paltsev et 
al. (2008) analysis, the core cases severely limited nuclear growth beyond its existing capacity 
based on anticipated regulatory and siting limitations. U.S. nuclear expansion now appears more 
likely, but the costs of these plants are now seen to be more expensive than their representation 
in the earlier work. 
Renewables, especially wind, have been expanding at a high rate, albeit from a very small 
base, and are looking more viable than assumed earlier. Casual observation of the rapid growth 
rates might suggest these sources are now competitive with conventional generation. However, 
that evidence does not reveal the full cost of wind or solar at a large scale. Current investment 
has been spurred by significant tax incentives and subsidies. While representing the after tax-
incentive cost in the EPPA model might produce an accurate portrayal of current market 
penetration, simply lowering the cost to reflect the subsidies would underestimate the hidden 
costs to taxpayers and utility customers. Also, one motivation for these subsidies is to 
demonstrate the technology, and it is reasonable to assume they will be phased out once the 
technology is demonstrated.  Expansion of wind or solar to larger shares of generation will also 
require more storage or redundant capacity to accommodate their intermittency, and an increase 
in the transmission network to bring this dispersed energy source to demand areas. The submodel 
of these sources has been revised to better capture these various influences.1 
                                                 
1 Energy prices have also swung widely since the time of our earlier analysis of these proposals.  We do not consider 
these effects.  The previous work by Paltsev et al. (2008) showed a slower and gradual rise in the oil price, and 
did not reproduce the recent high prices, suggesting that the run-up was not supportable on long-term 
fundamentals. The collapse of oil prices may provide some support for that interpretation. Furthermore, the 
recent volatility provides little information of use in calibrating a model that solves for five-year periods. 
 2
While the previous reduction targets examined by Paltsev et al. (2008) remain relevant the 
policy details have evolved.  Nearly all proposals seek to achieve major cuts in greenhouse gas 
emissions, so the 287 bmt case (just holding emissions constant) is not of much relevance to 
current discussions.  The overall nationwide targets now being discussed remain within the 167 
to 203 bmt range, however, with more emphasis on targets consistent with the 167 bmt case.  
Also, as these proposals have been reworked several subtle changes have been introduced that 
can affect the overall cost.  For example, while it has generally been recognized that any actual 
cap-and-trade system is likely to leave out some emissions sources, the past proposals tended to 
proportionately scale allowance allocations for covered sectors, allowing the uncapped sectors to 
avoid restriction and possibly to grow. As a result the nominal national-level cap would be 
exceeded.  Given increased concerns about the risk of climate change there is now interest in 
more than proportionately reducing allowances to capped sectors to make up for lack of control 
in the uncapped sectors. There is also increased interest in coupling a cap-and-trade system with 
regulatory policies such as a renewable portfolio standard that would give an assured boost to a 
subset of technologies.  
Also the relationship of long-term targets to near-term actions and policy costs is a growing 
issue. Our earlier work showed that targets which are tightened over time tended to stimulate 
banking of allowances in the near term.  As a result, near term targets were more than met and 
the near term CO2-e prices rose above the level one might expect given the relatively smaller 
reductions required in the early years. The reason to set longer term targets is to provide clear 
direction on where emitters need to be in the future and thereby provide incentives for 
investment in aggressive mitigation options. However, policy proposals that specify an ambitious 
long-run goal but only provide allowances on a much shorter rolling time scale, and that show 
concern about cost containment, may signal to emitters that the long-term target is only an 
aspiration, and is easily changed. Even forward-looking firms may discount ambitious distant 
goals as not credible. In that case the incentive to bank allowances is much reduced, with 
substantial implications for short-term effort and cost. 
We investigate these issues, structuring our paper in the following way.  In Section 2 we 
briefly describe the EPPA model and focus on the specific updates we have made for this 
analysis.  Section 3 provides a comparison of the new results for the three cases—287, 203, and 
167 bmt—with our previous estimates.  In Section 4 we focus on the 167 bmt case and examine 
how, given a national target, details of implementation or different expectations about 
technology can lead to significant differences in costs and the success of different technologies.  
In particular we focus, in turn, on (1) shortening the banking time horizon to 2030, which is 
consistent with the assumption that the 2050 target is not fully credible, (2) excluding hard-to-
monitor sectors from the cap while tightening the constraint on the capped sectors to make up for 
these emissions, and (3) effects of different assumptions about the cost of CCS, nuclear and 
renewables.  In terms of technology alternatives we focus on results for the electricity sector.  
Other details on economy-wide emissions and other economic indicators are provided in the on-
line Appendix. We conclude in Section 5. 
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2. THE EMISSIONS PREDICTION AND POLICY ANALYSIS (EPPA) MODEL 
The standard version of the EPPA model (Table 1) is a multi-region, multi-sector recursive-
dynamic representation of the global economy (Paltsev et al., 2005).2  The recursive solution 
approach means that current period investment, savings, and consumption decisions are made on 
the basis of current period prices.  
Table 1.  EPPA Model Details. 
Country or Region†  Sectors Factors 
Developed Final Demand Sectors Capital  
   United States (USA) Agriculture  Labor  
   Canada (CAN) Services  Crude Oil Resources 
   Japan (JPN) Energy-Intensive Products  Natural Gas Resources 
   European Union+ (EUR) Other Industries Products  Coal Resources 
   Australia & New Zealand (ANZ) Transportation  Shale Oil Resources 
   Former Soviet Union (FSU) Household Transportation  Nuclear Resources 
   Eastern Europe (EET) Other Household Demand Hydro Resources 
Developing Energy Supply & Conversion Wind/Solar Resources 
   India (IND)  Electric Generation Land 
   China (CHN)     Conventional Fossil   
   Indonesia (IDZ)      Hydro   
   Higher Income East Asia (ASI)      Existing Nuclear   
   Mexico (MEX)      Wind, Solar   
   Central & South America (LAM)      Biomass   
   Middle East (MES)      Advanced Gas   
   Africa (AFR)      Advanced Gas with CCS   
   Rest of World (ROW)       Advanced Coal with CCS   
         Advanced Nuclear   
   Fuels  
      Coal  
       Crude Oil, Shale Oil, Refined Oil   
      Natural Gas, Gas from Coal  
      Liquids from Biomass  
       Synthetic Gas    
† Specific detail on regional groupings is provided in Paltsev et al. (2005). 
 
 Table 1 broadly identifies final demand sectors and energy supply and conversion sectors.  
Final demand sectors include five industrial sectors and two household demands, transportation 
and other household activities (space conditioning, lighting, etc.), as shown in the table. Energy 
supply and conversion sectors are modeled in enough detail to identify fuels and technologies 
with different CO2 emissions and to represent both fossil and non-fossil advanced technologies.  
The synthetic coal gas industry produces a perfect substitute for natural gas. The oil shale 
industry produces a perfect substitute for refined oil. All electricity generation technologies 
produce perfectly substitutable electricity except for Wind and Solar which is modeled as 
                                                 
2 The EPPA model can also be solved as a perfect foresight model.  See Gurgel et al. (2007) and Babiker et al. 
(2008).  
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producing an imperfect substitute, reflecting its diurnal and seasonal variability. Biomass use is 
included both in electric generation and in transport where a liquid fuel is produced that is 
assumed to be a perfect substitute for refined oil.  
 There are 16 geographical regions represented explicitly in the model including major 
countries (the U.S., Japan, Canada, China, India, and Indonesia) and 10 regions that are an 
aggregations of countries.  While the results in this paper focus on the U.S., economic and 
population growth and policies assumed to be in place abroad affect world markets, depletion of 
resources, and therefore the U.S. economy through international trade.  In this exercise we follow 
the Energy Modeling Forum protocol on policy in other regions (Clarke et al., 2009), with the 
developed countries reducing to 50% below 1990 levels by 2050; China, India, Russia, and 
Brazil starting in 2030 on a linear path to 50% below their 2030 emissions level by 2070; and the 
rest of the countries delaying action beyond the 2050 horizon of our study.  
 The model includes representation of abatement of non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions (CH4, 
N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6) and the calculations consider both the emissions mitigation that 
occurs as a byproduct of actions directed at CO2 and reductions resulting from gas-specific 
control measures. Targeted control measures include reductions in the emissions of: CO2 from 
the combustion of fossil fuels; the industrial gases that replace CFCs controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol and produced at aluminum smelters; CH4 from fossil energy production and use, 
agriculture, and waste, and N2O from fossil fuel combustion, chemical production and improved 
fertilizer use. More detail on how abatement costs are represented for these substances is 
provided in Hyman et al. (2003).  
 When emissions constraints on certain countries, gases, or sectors are imposed in a CGE 
model such as EPPA, the model calculates a shadow value of the constraint which is 
interpretable as a price that would be obtained under an allowance market that developed under a 
cap and trade system.  The solution algorithm of the EPPA model finds least-cost reductions for 
each gas in each sector and if emissions trading is allowed it equilibrates the prices among 
sectors and gases (using GWP weights). This set of conditions, often referred to as “what” and 
“where” flexibility, will tend to lead to least-cost abatement.  Without these conditions 
abatement costs will vary among sources and that will affect the estimated welfare cost—
abatement will be least-cost within a sector or region or for a specific gas, but will not be 
equilibrated among them. 
 The mixed complementarity solution approach of the model means that least-cost is defined in 
terms of the tax inclusive prices (for fuels, electricity, capital, labor, and other goods) faced by 
producers and consumers given the technology set at any point in time.  It does not necessarily 
lead to a welfare optimum in the presence of distortions (e.g., energy taxes) or to the extent 
combined actions of individual agents have macroeconomic consequences such as affecting the 
terms of trade of a country/region (Babiker et al., 2004; Paltsev et al., 2007).  We simulate 
banking and borrowing, which implies foresight, by forcing the theoretical perfect foresight 
result that the CO2-e price path must rise at the discount rate, assumed to be 4%.  We do this by 
choosing an initial price so that the cumulative emissions are consistent with the policy target 
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over the horizon of the policy. Allowing banking and borrowing is sometimes referred to as 
“when” flexibility.  A price path rising at the discount rate means that the discounted price is 
equal in all time periods which is the temporal equivalent of equating the price across sectors or 
regions.  
 This approach to simulating banking approximates well the behavior of a perfect foresight 
model (Gurgel, et al., 2007) and generates a smooth price path.  Prices in real markets display 
volatility as observed in CO2 prices in the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) operating in 
Europe.  Of more relevance to the modeled price path is the observation that future prices and 
current prices differ by a risk free interest rate.  This result is observed in the ETS and reflects 
the possibility of arbitrage profits where, if this interest rate differential is not met, a combination 
of current purchase and forward sales, or vice versa would generate risk-free profits above that 
which could be obtained on low risk investments such as government bonds.  In a similar 
manner, the price simulated by the model is meant to represents the interest rate differential 
between current and future prices for allowances.  Under different assumptions about growth, 
technological options, and other inputs, different prices can be obtained that can vary quite a lot.  
The range one would get from such variation in assumptions is more comparable to the volatility 
of observed prices, where that volatility occurs as new information is revealed and changes 
expectations about the future. 
3. COMPARISON OF NEW RESULTS TO PREVIOUS RESULTS 
3.1 Modeling Assumptions 
 As noted above, one purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of recent changes in the 
economic and technology outlook.  Table 2 describes the key assumptions regarding technology 
costs and GDP growth in our previous study compared with the assumptions used here.  Average 
GDP growth for 2005 to 2050 is slower by 0.4% per year, in part, because we factor in the 
current recession.  Lower GDP growth compounded over 40 years results in emissions that are 
nearly 20% lower in 2050.  
 The cost mark-up defines the cost of the advanced electricity technologies relative to 
electricity prices in the 1997 base year of the model. In the previous work, we applied a mark-up 
of 2.26 to a technology sector meant to represent a combination of wind and solar.  In the revised 
model we have disaggregated this combined sector into two: wind and solar considered as 
separate sources.  Also, we apply lower mark-up costs (1.0 and 1.5 respectively), implying that 
wind is competitive and solar costs just 50% more than conventional electricity.  The biomass 
electricity markup is reduced from 2.1 to 1.1. 
Renewables enter the electricity sector in the EPPA model as imperfect substitutes for other 
electricity.3  That means that the mark-up costs are the cost of the first installations of these 
generation sources.  We assume these are located at sites with access to the best quality 
resources, at locations most easily integrated into the grid, and at levels where variable resources 
                                                 
3 For a description of this component of the EPPA model, see Paltsev et al. (2005). 
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can be accommodated without significant investment in storage or back-up.  The elasticity of 
substitution creates a gradually increasing cost of production as the share of renewables increases 
in the generation mix.  Thus, the mark-up cost strictly applies only to the first installations of 
these sources, and further expansion as a share of overall generation of electricity comes at 
greater cost.  Previously the elasticity was 1.0, which effectively limited renewables to a 
relatively small share of generation.  In these new simulations we increase it to 3.0, making it 
easier and less costly to expand the renewable share.    
The mark-ups on nuclear and coal with CCS, which are modeled as perfect substitutes for 
other conventional generation, were raised from 1.25 and 1.19 to 1.7 and 1.6 respectively. Some 
current estimates for coal with CCS suggest even higher mark-ups but here we assume this is for 
the nth plant after some experience is gained in the technology, and assuming that experience 
leads to lower costs. 
Table 2.  Key Economic and Technology Assumptions. 
  Report 146 Current study 
GDP growth, 2005-2050, rate/yr   2.9%   2.5% 
2050 baseline emissions 13.3 GtCO2e 10.8 GtCO2e 
Renewable electricity  
   Solar mark-up  2.26   1.5 
   Wind mark-up  2.26   1.0 
   Biomass mark-up  2.1   1.1 
   Substitution elasticity  1.0   3.0 
Advanced nuclear mark-up  1.25*   1.7 
CCS markup coal/gas  1.19/1.17   1.6/1.6 
Adv. Natural Gas Combined Cycle  0.95   1.2 
*Except for some sensitivity cases, advanced nuclear was assumed 
to be unavailable. 
 
There is much concern about the U.S. and world economy, with many indicators of economic 
performance suggesting a recession that could be quite severe by historic standards.  In terms of 
GDP growth, the annual data through 2008 still does not look that dire compared to history 
(Figure 1). 
In addition to historical data, the figure includes annual growth rates of GDP as forecasted by 
the U.S. Energy Information Administration in the central case of their early release 2009 energy 
outlook (EIA, 2008).  They assume negative growth in 2009, some rebound in 2010, and then a 
return to a basically stable long-term trend.  We use these same rates, averaging them over the 
five-year time step of the EPPA model. The five-year average rates are plotted as blue dots 
(historical data), red dots (EIA forecast period), pink dots (our extension of the EIA forecast 
which is only through 2030), and in brown are growth assumptions from our previous U.S. 
study.  As plotted in Figure 1 the difference between our previous growth rates and the new ones 
look insignificant except for the first period.  The appearance is driven by the scale of the graph 
needed to show historical rates. The actual difference is 0.5% per year or more through 2030, 
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and that big a difference persisting for many years has a fairly significant effect on the level of 
the economy and emissions. 
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Figure 1.  U.S. GDP Growth Rates, 1930 to 2008 and Projected Rates to 2050. 
 
 We have also adjusted down growth in other developed countries, while our long-term 
forecast for China and India is higher than in Paltsev, et al. (2008).  The earlier estimates for 
India and China were below actual performance that was already observed since 2005.  The new 
growth rates are still below the very high rates seen before the recent economic crises.  These 
new growth rates include, as shown for the U.S., a near-term impact of the economic crisis but 
then a return to solid growth rates.  The longer term growth rates for the developed countries are 
slower than in our past work, reflecting not so much the lasting impact of the current economic 
crisis, but rather a re-evaluation of long-term growth prospects, where we still are quite 
optimistic.  Essentially we had extended through the next few decades the relatively robust 
growth of the late 1990’s through 2005.  If recovery from the current economic crisis is much 
slower, or signals a more fundamental change in growth prospects, then economic and emissions 
growth could be lower.  At this point, however, the current economic problems appear to stem 
from a housing bubble, loose lending, and the follow-on financial problems that once worked 
through, would not affect productivity improvements that underlie long term economic growth.  
3.2 Previous and New Results 
The resulting U.S. GDP and greenhouse gas emissions in a “No policy” (Reference) case are 
presented in Figure 2 and compared with similar results from our earlier work. Assumptions 
about slower economic growth lead to 15% lower GDP level (37.5 trillion instead of 44.2 trillion 
of 2005$) and 19% lower GHG emissions (10.7 Gt instead of 13.3 Gt CO2e) by 2050. 
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Figure 2. U.S. GDP and GHG in reference scenario. 
 
Figure 3 compares the CO2-e price and welfare results from Paltsev et al. (2008) (Figure 3a 
and b) with our new results based on the changes discussed above (Figure 3c and d). For the 287 
bmt case we see the strong effect of the lower economic growth assumption on the reference 
emissions.  This abatement level requires very little action with prices starting at $5/tCO2-e and 
only rising to $20 by 2050 in the new results compared with prices starting at $18 and rising to 
$70 in the old results.  The revised technology assumptions have little effect in this case because 
these prices are insufficient to bring many of these alternatives into the picture; the cap is met by 
other, less expensive means. 
In contrast, the CO2-e prices for the 203 and 167 bmt cases are roughly equal or slightly 
higher in the new results than in the old.  While advanced nuclear is available in these new 
scenarios (in Figure 3a and b simulations it was not allowed to grow), its cost is much higher 
than the CCS in the older results and the new CCS cost is also higher. The initial renewable 
installations are less expensive than in the old simulations, and also less than the old CCS cost, 
and these changes might be expected to lower the CO2-e price and make the nuclear and CCS 
costs irrelevant.  This does not happen because the increasing costs at higher levels of renewable 
penetration (as represented by the imperfect substitute assumption, even with the higher 
elasticity) does not allow them to completely substitute for nuclear and coal with CCS.  As a 
result, the price in the 167 bmt case starts at $58 in the new results compared with $53 in the old 
results and by 2050 rises to $230 instead of $210.  
The welfare results mirror the CO2-e price with the 2050 result in the 167 bmt case showing 
a 2.5% loss compared with about 1.75% loss in the old results.  The new results show a smoother 
increase in the welfare costs over time.  This change in pattern results because the old 
simulations had developing countries substantially increasing their reductions in 2035, and this 
resulted in a substantial improvement in the terms of trade for the U.S. in that period.  The new 
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simulations assume that policies abroad phase in more gradually. There still are terms of trade 
effects from actions abroad, but they are realized more gradually so there is not such a short-term 
impact as before.  The welfare costs in the 287 bmt case with the new growth assumptions are 
lower than under the previous growth assumptions.  
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Figure 3.  CO2-e Price and Welfare Results for Three Policy Scenarios: (a) Paltsev et al. 
(2008) CO2-e Price, (b) Paltsev et al. (2008) Welfare Change, (c) CO2-e Price with 
Revised Technological and Economic Outlook, (d) Welfare Change with Revised 
Technological and Economic Outlook. 
 
 Compared to the earlier analysis, we have made changes in technology outlook in the 
electricity sector, so we focus on the generation sources for the no-policy reference and the three 
policy cases, shown in Figure 4.  As previously, the no policy reference is strongly dominated 
by coal generation, with other sources basically maintaining their 2005 level.  The exceptions are 
solar and wind, which now expand from 0.5 EJ in 2010 to 1.1 EJ by 2050 rather than from 0.2 EJ 
to 0.6EJ as in the previous study.  However, even with that rapid expansion they remain a small 
share.  As discussed, the 287 bmt case is insufficient to get advanced nuclear or coal with CCS.  
The small reductions needed are met with natural gas, an expansion of renewables and some 
reduction in demand.  Since this is an economy-wide and all-GHG scenario some of the 
economy-wide reductions in all these cases are occurring in fuel use outside the electricity sector 
and from reductions of non-CO2 GHGs. 
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(f) Paltsev et al.  (2008) 167 bmt
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Figure 4.  Electricity Generation by Sources in the Reference and Policy Cases: (a) 
Reference, (b) 287 bmt, (c) 203 bmt, (d) 167 bmt, (e) Paltsev et al. (2008) 203 bmt,  
(f) Paltsev et al. (2008) 167 bmt. 
 
The impacts of the new technology assumptions are more apparent in the 203 and 167 bmt 
cases.  Even though the nuclear mark-up is somewhat higher than the coal CCS mark-up we find 
that nuclear dominates in both cases.  CCS exists in the 203 bmt case but the level is so small 
that it does not show up well in the graph.  The reason for the success of nuclear over coal with 
CCS is that the assumption that coal CCS will capture only 90% of the CO2 emissions means 
that the extra cost associated with allowances needed to cover those emissions raise the CCS 
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cost, thereby favoring nuclear.  Also, renewables play a much larger role, increasing to on the 
order of 20% of generation whereas in the old analysis they were never more than a few percent. 
A not immediately intuitive result in the 167 bmt case is that, even though the constraint is 
tighter and CO2-e prices are higher than in the 203 bmt case, CCS applied to coal and gas plays a 
substantial role.  The reason is that, as formulated in the EPPA model, there are adjustment costs 
that increase for an advanced technology as the rate of expansion increases.  The representation 
of this phenomenon is based on expansion of nuclear power in the late 1960’s to the mid-1980’s, 
when nearly all new base load capacity was nuclear.  Thus what is happening in the 167 bmt case 
is that decarbonization of the electricity sector must proceed so rapidly to meet the economy-
wide target that adjustment costs in the favored technology (nuclear) are pushing up its cost and 
thereby allowing the CCS technologies to compete. Since fossil sources with CCS still emit 
some CO2, more reductions are needed elsewhere in the economy to make up for those 
emissions.  It also means that these extra adjustment costs run up the cost of the policy, and that 
ultimately the CCS technologies will go away as nuclear ultimately dominates.  CCS appears 
only because nuclear cannot expand fast enough, but once the capacity to expand nuclear catches 
up the CCS plants will depreciate away to be replaced by nuclear.  
4. DETAILS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND TECHNOLOGY ASSUMPTIONS 
4.1 System Coverage 
Generally, GHG reduction targets focus on total national emissions—all emissions affect 
global concentrations and thus international discussions tend to focus on the national aggregate. 
Nonetheless, considerations of policy implementation often lead to a focus on a subset of 
emissions sources.  Often this is because, it is argued at least, it is not worth the measurement 
and monitoring cost to include small and dispersed sources in a cap-and-trade system.  That may 
be true in some policy designs: for example, the number of small sources increases the farther 
downstream the system is imposed.  For energy-related CO2 emissions, of course, it is possible to 
move upstream, placing the point of control at the coal mine or electric generating station, 
refinery gate or natural gas distribution system. Any CO2 price is then passed through to final 
consumers as it would have been if they were directly required to surrender allowances.  Such an 
upstream system can reduce the number of control points and thereby make including these small 
end-use sources less onerous. But if the implementation is downstream, small sources are an 
issue. In addition, in an effort to limit costs imposed directly on consumers, some proposals 
would omit household use of natural gas and heating oil. 
For non-energy emissions of other greenhouse gases, and of CO2 from land use change, 
control must be imposed at the point of emissions because going upstream or downstream can 
lead to an inefficient result.  That is because incentives for available reduction options may not 
be provided by prices imposed upstream or downstream of that point.  For example, 
implementation of the cap-and-trade system could be upstream and apply allowances to fertilizer 
sales, thereby reducing N2O emissions from inorganic fertilizer use.  The allowances required 
could vary by the form of the fertilizer if there were evidence that emissions of N2O varied by 
 12
the type applied.  (Applied as anhydrous ammonia there are probably more N2O emissions than 
if applied in a solid form.)  Unfortunately, this approach would not provide incentives to apply 
the fertilizer at times of the year when less would be volatized as N2O. Methane emissions from 
livestock are even more difficult. Allowances could be required for each head of cattle sold, 
based on estimated methane emissions, but this would not provide incentives to reduce rates of 
methane emission per head but only the number of livestock. Or, if there were relatively easy 
ways to reduce methane emissions from manure handling, a policy that simply reduced the 
number of livestock would not efficiently get at that abatement option.  
Following the definitions appearing in some current policy discussions, we explore a policy 
design where agriculture, services, and the household sector (ex. personal transportation) are left 
uncapped.  This leaves out of the system many of the diffuse sources in the service sector and 
non-GHG emissions from agriculture and waste.  Transportation, including the private 
automobile, is included through an upstream cap. This design is similar to that in the Warner-
Lieberman Bill submitted to the previous session of Congress and analyzed by Paltsev et al. 
(2008).  Interpretations of that bill were that the percentage reductions would apply only to the 
included sectors, and thus national emissions would not fall by that percentage as the uncapped 
sectors might grow—or at least would not fall.  Here we consider the case where additional 
reductions are imposed on the capped sectors so that the overall percentage reduction targets are 
met for the economy.    
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Figure 5.  Effects of Meeting a National Target with Agriculture, Services and Household 
Sectors Excluded from Cap: (a) CO2-e Price, (b) Welfare Change. 
 
Our main interest is how much this approach increases the cost of meeting an emissions 
target, and Figure 5 shows the effect on CO2-e prices and the welfare cost for the 167 bmt case 
with excluded sectors (167_sector) compared with the case where we achieve the nation-wide 
target by including all sources. The omitted sectors emissions are about 17% of base-year 
emissions; in the no-policy reference they are growing more slowly than other emissions and so 
they fall to about 13% of economy-wide GHG emissions by 2050.  Excluding these emissions 
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from the cap, and forcing more reductions in the capped sectors, has a more than proportional 
impact on costs.  The CO2-e price goes up by about 30% and the welfare cost is increased by 
different amounts in different years but by as much as 30 to 50% in many years.  This more-
than-proportional response should not be surprising as (1) we are not taking advantage of low-
cost reductions in the excluded sectors, and (2) we are forcing more high-cost reductions in the 
capped sectors.   
4.2 Target Credibility and Banking Behavior 
The next simulation considers truncation of the banking horizon to 2030.  The resulting 
welfare and CO2-e prices are shown in Table 3. GHG prices are reduced by more than one-half 
and the welfare effects are reduced to less than one-third of the loss compared to the case with 
the 2050 banking horizon.  Thus, the near-term targets are relatively modest, and with banking 
over the full horizon it is the post-2030 reductions that are driving near term prices to higher 
levels. If the long term targets are ignored then much less needs to be done in the near term, and 
the costs are lower.  With forward looking behavior, future reductions will affect near term 
prices but the effect will depend on how strong a reduction is required in the longer term and the 
representation of technological options.  As noted earlier, if market participants view the long 
term targets as not credible then they may not bank for the future, expecting looser targets and 
lower prices.  Or, if our representation of technology in the long term is much more pessimistic 
than that held by market participants then current prices would not be driven up as much as we 
have simulated in the 2050 banking case.  
Table 3. Effects of a Shorter Banking Horizon. 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Welfare cost 
   167 bmt -0.22 -0.63 -1.05   -1.52 
   167_2030 -0.03 -0.18 -0.30   -0.41 
CO2-e price 
   167 bmt 58 71 86 105 
   167_2030 25 31 37   45 
 
The results with the shorter banking horizon give an idea of the importance of these effects 
on current prices.  Obviously, long term targets could be changed in either direction, leading to 
higher or lower prices than those obtained assuming the long term target is met exactly.  
Similarly, market participants could be more pessimistic about technology in the long term than 
we have represented.  If so, near term costs would be higher than we have estimated in the 2050 
banking case, not lower.  Also, the 2030 banking case is on the low end of what costs could be in 
these cases, assuming our representation of pre-2030 technology options is accurate.  To get 
lower pre-2030 prices based on optimism about technology or skepticism about the policy in the 
post-2030 period it would have to be possible to borrow from the future, and most legislation 
limits such borrowing.  We should also note that the 2050 horizon also truncates the banking 
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horizon.  Banked allowances are being used in 2050, so that actual emissions are above the 
allocated allowances in that year.  Thus, even if annual allowance allocations remained at the 
2050 level in the post-2050 period further sharp cuts from the simulated 2050 emissions level 
would be needed.  Hence, if we simulated over a longer horizon we would likely see further 
banking and even higher prices in the near term. 
Figure 6 shows what the shorter banking horizon does to the generation choices. The effects 
are dramatic. In the standard 167 bmt case coal is largely phased out even by 2030 and 
renewables have expanded substantially.  Advanced CCS and nuclear are small but beginning to 
be developed in this case.  With the 2030 horizon, very little of that change takes place.  Coal use 
stays high and there is no CCS or nuclear expansion.  These results illustrate the role of long 
term targets. With them, important preparations for deeper cuts after 2030 are put in place by 
2030 but if they are ignored as not credible then it will be that much more difficult to achieve the 
deeper cuts.  With the lower prices, taking seriously only the targets through 2030, the needed 
transformation of the electricity sector to non-fossil alternatives is barely started.  Also, if the 
future targets are ignored then there is little incentive to do the demonstration and research that 
might bring about cheaper technology.  These results reveal an important aspect of the policy 
challenge of providing credible long term targets while trying to keep near term economic costs 
manageable.  
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Figure 6.  Electricity Generation Choices with a Shorter Banking Horizon: (a) 167 bmt, (b) 
167_2030. 
  
 Another argument sometimes put forward for ignoring the long term targets in simulation 
exercises of this type is that planning horizons of firms only extend 20 years or so into the future.  
However, the short planning horizon argument appears fallacious to us.  A source of confusion 
on this issue is that observers fail to take account of the fact that we will gradually approach 
these longer term goals, and as we approach them they will become more relevant to decisions at 
that point in time.  Thus, the effect of the post-2030 reductions on 2015 emissions, seen by 
comparing Figure 6a with Figure 6b, is noticeable but not that extreme.  Coal use drops a little 
faster and renewables penetrate a bit more when the horizon is 2050.  The bigger differences 
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begin occurring in 2020, but by that time 2030 is only 10 years away. Assuming those making 
decisions about generation investments are still looking ahead 20 years, their planning period 
will include 10 years beyond 2030, and by that time the technology and policy environment after 
2030 will be much clearer.   
Of course, it may be that the clearing picture will include either a less ambitious target or 
market expectations of advances in technology beyond what we have represented in our 
modeling effort.  However, progress on these technologies would have to come quickly.  Many 
of the advanced technologies we represent have been in development for many years already.  A 
radically new technology will require testing and demonstration and then will only gradually 
penetrate the market, especially in the electric sector where investments are long-lived.  The 
other factor to consider is that the planning horizon of individual firms that must abate is not 
necessarily relevant to whether long term expectations will affect near term prices.  Unless 
allowances ownership is restricted, anyone can acquire allowances and hold them on the 
expectation that the asset will appreciate.  Investors of all types, with a variety of expectations, 
will determine how future targets affect current prices.  
4.3 Other Policy Implementation Issues 
There are other policy implementation issues that could have strong effects on costs.  One 
feature in most proposed cap and trade systems are credits from reductions outside the system 
either from trading with a foreign region that is capped (e.g., the ETS) or from projects in 
uncapped domestic sectors (e.g., land use emissions) or in countries without caps (e.g., Clean 
Development Mechanism credits).  These are often seen as measures that would significantly 
reduce costs.  The effects of such credits on domestic costs are very difficult to assess and it is 
easy to overestimate their contribution to lower costs for several reasons: (1) The value of 
trading with other regions depends on the autarkic price in those regions.  If other regions are 
taking similar cuts then the autarkic price may be similar to domestic autarkic prices and trading 
will provide very little advantage. (2) The amount of project credits from uncapped sectors and 
regions are easy to overestimate because the project assessment and baseline establishment tends 
to be onerous and as a result these credit systems appear to generate only a small fraction of the 
credits one might expect from these sectors if they were capped. (3) For CDM-type credits the 
goal is to have these regions eventually take on real caps, and as they do the pool of potential 
credits is lowered. (4) There will be international competition for credits and for foreign 
allowances that will bid up the prices for them. Often in analysis of domestic policies 
competition for foreign credits is not considered, and it is assumed that these foreign credits will 
come in at prices substantially below the autarkic domestic price, with the difference maintained 
by limits on the use of credits.  In Paltsev et al. (2008) we considered some of these issues with 
credits and international emissions trading. 
Another feature of many proposals are a host of complementary policies such as renewable 
portfolio standards, fuel standards, public infrastructure investments such as in alternative transit 
systems, building codes, and efficiency regulations among other things.  These are difficult to 
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assess because the number of things considered can be nearly endless.  One might consider these 
measures in three categories:  (1) Redundant measures focused narrowly on advancing particular 
technologies, (2) Policies designed to address market failures, and (3) Investment in public 
infrastructure that under higher energy prices brought about by GHG mitigation policy might be 
justified. 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) and Renewable Fuels Standards (RFS) or Low Carbon 
Fuel Standards (LCFS) are examples of measure that are at best redundant—the GHG cap-and-
trade would get to the RPS or RFS goal without the standards—or they add to the economy-wide 
cost of the policy by shifting investment away from the least-cost options and toward meeting 
these specific standards.  In this case they can reduce the CO2 price while raising the welfare cost 
of the policy.  
Building codes, appliance standards, and similar measures may fall into category 2 because it 
is not implausible that the average household may not fully understand the source of energy costs 
in the household and how to control them.  Such standards and codes already exist. Anticipating 
that energy prices will rise with implementation of a cap-and-trade system means that current 
codes should be revised if such measures were justified in the first place.  We are skeptical that 
there are massive no cost options here. For one thing, code development, appliance labeling, and 
standards development in response to changing prices is reflected in estimates of price 
elasticities from periods that included these measures as a response to earlier periods of higher 
prices.  To the extent elasticity estimates we use in the model already include such responses, if 
there are not similar complementary policies of this type costs may be higher than we estimate.  
Finally, the transportation system and development patterns are strongly affected by public 
investment.  To the extent those public investments respond to demands of citizens, which are 
likely to change with higher energy prices, one might expect that the nature of public investment 
and zoning and planning that shape development of urban areas should change. More public 
transportation, support for pedestrian or bicycle traffic, or zoning changes that allow for denser 
development are public decisions that may respond to changed demands of a citizenry facing 
higher energy prices brought on by a GHG cap-and-trade system.  Thus, in principle such 
investments can be complementary to the GHG policy, providing cost-effective options to more 
energy intensive life styles. 
The caricatures of each of the measures above do not do justice to these complex issues.  If 
there is hope that an RPS can overcome initial development costs and lead eventually to 
technologies that compete on their own there may be some justification for them. In the codes 
and standards or public investment areas it is not hard to go too far and legislate standards that 
are not in the interest of fully informed consumers or to invest in infrastructure that is 
underutilized or for which the marginal value is below the marginal cost.  To fully investigate the 
role of these complementary measures requires a much more careful assessment than is possible 
here.  
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4.4 Technology Costs 
We next consider the effect of different cost assumptions about nuclear, CCS, and 
renewables. In a nuclear case (167_nuclear) we give the cost advantage to nuclear, assuming its 
mark-up is 1.5, somewhat lower than CCS at 1.6. In a case favoring CCS (167_ccs) we increase 
the nuclear mark-up to 2.0.  In a third case (167_wind_gas) we assume that neither nuclear or 
CCS will be available at all.  This last case is motivated by the possible difficulties in siting 
nuclear plants or potential regulatory hurdles for the development of storage for captured CO2. In 
a fourth case (167_wind_slow) we go back to our original elasticity of 1.0 for renewable sources 
which slows renewable penetration on the basis that expansion requires a significant additional 
cost for storage and back-up generation. The price and welfare effects are shown in Table 4 and 
compared with the basic 167 bmt case. 
Table 4.  Effects of Alternative Technology Assumptions. 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Welfare Change        
   167 bmt -0.22 -0.63 -1.05 -1.52 -2.03 -2.32 -2.38 -2.52 
   167_nuclear -0.15 -0.68 -1.27 -1.65 -1.91 -1.99 -2.01 -1.96 
   167_ccs -0.23 -0.65 -1.08 -1.56 -1.98 -2.29 -2.38 -2.54 
   167_wind_gas -0.28 -0.73 -1.17 -1.63 -1.97 -2.16 -2.63 -2.99 
   167_wind_slow -0.17 -0.54 -1.05 -1.60 -2.04 -2.32 -2.38 -2.60 
CO2-e Price        
   167 bmt 58 71   86 105 127 155 188 229 
   167_nuclear 48 59   71   87 106 129 157 190 
   167_ccs 59 72   88 107 130 159 193 235 
   167_wind_gas 67 82 100 121 148 180 218 266 
   167_wind_slow 60 73   88 108 131 159 194 236 
 
The direction of price and welfare with these changes, compared to earlier assumptions, is as 
expected though care is needed in interpretation of the results.  The nuclear case has a lower 
welfare cost because we assumed nuclear was less expensive, and the CCS case is more 
expensive because CCS comes in by virtue of the fact that we raised the nuclear cost.  If instead 
we had dropped the CCS cost to something more substantially below nuclear, then the welfare 
costs in that case would have fallen.   
Perhaps more interesting is the 167_wind_gas case. The exclusion of CCS and nuclear rule 
out two big low-carbon options, which should make the task of achieving these goals much 
harder.  While excluding these options raises the cost substantially the simulation results 
suggests it does not make the target unachievable—by 2050 the welfare loss is higher, compared 
to the 167 bmt case by about 0.5 percent and the 2015 CO2-e price is about $10 per ton higher.  
Similarly, the 167_wind_slow case increases the cost, but relatively modestly.  Since raising the 
price of one option, or even making some options unavailable, just leads to use of other options, 
the cost impact is moderated.  Assuming that any one option becomes very inexpensive would 
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have a big impact on costs, or assuming that none of the options are available or were very costly 
would increase the costs much more.  The ranges we explore here appear to capture ranges one 
might reasonably expect. 
We turn next to the generation choices in these scenarios to see better how these targets are 
achieved under different cost assumptions (Figure 7).  In the 167_nuclear case the relatively 
small cost advantage for nuclear allows it to dominate and at the 1.5 markup it also substantially 
limits renewable expansion.  Even gas is driven out. This result may be unrealistic as it is not 
clear where peak and shoulder generation would come from in this case since nuclear cannot be 
flexibly dispatched.  In the 167_ccs case, both coal and gas CCS play a role and natural gas use 
expands.  With only a 90% capture rate on the CCS technologies, more gas, and a slightly slower 
phase out of conventional coal, it is clear that in this case emissions from the electricity sector 
are higher than under the 167_nuclear assumptions.   
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Figure 7. Alternative Technology Assumptions and Generation Choices: (a) 167_nuclear, 
(b) 167_ccs, (c) 167_wind_gas, (d) 167_wind_slow. 
 
Since we are focusing here only on the electricity sector, it is important to keep in mind that 
this is an economy-wide policy.  Thus, when there are cheaper options in the electricity sector as 
in the 167_nuclear case the electricity sector does more of the abatement and takes pressure off 
emissions elsewhere in the economy. In the 167_ccs case the electricity options are more 
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expensive and the CCS technologies are not completely carbon free.  As a result more of the 
reduction is pushed into the rest of the economy.  If neither advanced nuclear nor the CCS 
technologies are available then, as shown in the 167_wind_gas case, renewables and gas provide 
about two-thirds of the generation and existing nuclear and hydro power fill in the rest. As we 
noted above, meeting the 167 bmt target through the 2050 horizon without new nuclear or CCS 
is possible without increasing the costs dramatically.  
It should be noted that the viability of the 167_wind_gas case is questionable if the analysis 
is extended beyond 2050 in scenarios that require stabilization of GHG concentrations. This level 
of gas use in this case would eventually become problematic as very low levels of CO2 emissions 
are allowable.  In addition, another way the target is accomplished is by raising the near term 
prices and abating more immediately thus making room for emissions from natural gas 
generation in the 2040-2050 period.  If the horizon is shifted further, and the 80 percent 
reduction goal is maintained or increased, more and more of the reduction would need to be 
shifted forward, and there is an obvious limit to how much shifting can occur.  Thus, in the 
longer term the reliance on gas is probably not tenable. 
The broader lesson from these alternative technology cases is that fairly small changes in the 
relative costs of different technology options can lead to a very different set of generation 
choices.  The effect on the economy-wide cost is moderated if one or another option ends up 
more expensive or unavailable because there are other choices.  The value of broad economic 
incentive-based policy, as opposed to policies that focus on a particular technology, is that we do 
not need to guess which technology is going to succeed.   
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we updated an earlier analysis of the cost of GHG mitigation policy in the U.S.  
We focused on three policy scenarios described by the allowable emissions through 2050: 287, 
203, and 167 billion metric tons (bmts).  Since the time of the earlier analysis, a variety of 
conditions have changed that are likely to affect the cost of mitigation policy in the U.S.  The 
economic recession has dimmed the outlook for economic growth, likely leading to lower 
reference emissions which would tend to reduce the costs of meeting the policy.  At the same 
time, however, the costs and prospects for key low carbon technologies have changed.  Nuclear 
and CCS costs are now seen to be considerably higher than we estimated just a few years ago.  
On the positive side, however, some utilities are moving ahead with plans to build new nuclear 
power plants.  Thus, we have allowed an advanced generation of nuclear power plants to take 
market share if they can compete at the relatively higher costs.  Also, renewables are expanding 
rapidly and some progress has been made on the technologies.  It is unclear what the current 
rapid expansion of renewables means for the longer term because it is spurred by direct subsidies 
and favorable tax treatment.  Also, the domestic policy discussion has focused on the deeper 
emissions cuts and so the 287 bmt case is not that relevant to current legislative proposals.   
Combining all of these factors causes our estimates of the difficulty of meeting the 203 and 
167 bmt cases to rise somewhat. In the 167 bmt case the CO2-e price starts at $58/tCO2-e 
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compared with $53 in the old results and by 2050 rises to $230 instead of $210. The welfare 
results mirror the CO2-e price with the 2050 result in the 167 bmt case showing a 2.5% loss 
compared with about 1.75% loss in the old results.  The increase is similar in the 203 bmt case. 
The new results for the 287 bmt case actually have lower costs because the lower reference 
emissions resulting from slower economic growth dominate the changes in the technology cost 
assumptions. 
A number of questions have also arisen as to how the policy might be implemented.  For a 
variety of reasons, many proposed measures only directly control emissions on a subset of 
activities while international negotiations on emissions reductions tally up emissions from all 
sources.  Thus, to meet an agreed national target with a less than comprehensive cap-and-trade 
system would require tightening the cap to make up for the omitted sectors.  Most of the current 
proposals allow for credits from uncapped sectors to be brought into the cap-and-trade system.  If 
these offsets created incentives to reduce in the non-capped sectors as effectively as actually 
including those sectors under the cap, then further tightening of the cap on the controlled sectors 
and allowing these offsets to flow in would be equivalent to having a comprehensive national 
cap.  However, credit systems can be very ineffective, failing to create effective incentives for 
control with reductions in some projects offset by increased “leakage” emissions from other part 
of the sector.  We construct a case where the capped sectors must make up entirely for the failure 
to cap some sectors. We leave out agriculture, households, and the service sector that together 
account for about 17% of emissions, falling in our no policy case to 13% by 2050.  We find the 
cost impact to be more than proportional.  CO2-e prices increase by about 30%, and welfare costs 
increase as much as 30% to 50%, varying over the time horizon. Omissions are costly because 
we fail to take advantage of low cost reductions in these sectors, and we force more high cost 
reductions in the capped sectors. 
There are also skeptics of banking over long periods. Are these very long targets credible? 
Might we be too pessimistic in our representation of long term technology options? Do firms 
even look that far into future when making near term plans?  To consider these questions, we 
solved the model with banking only through 2030 implying that the targets and potential cost of 
meeting them after 2030 were ignored.  One assumption that would justify this under-banking 
behavior would be if the expectation was that abatement would be such after 2030 that the CO2-e 
price would continue to rise smoothly at the discount rate from the price solved in 2030 with the 
truncated horizon.  The truncated banking case cut near term welfare costs by two-thirds and the 
CO2-e price by more than one-half.  Thus, at least as we represent the economy and the 
technology choices available to it over this period, the post-2030 targets are a large driver of the 
near term costs of the policy.  If the policy is enacted, the market may have different 
expectations for technology options or be skeptical that these targets will be maintained, and so 
of course actual market results may differ from our representation.  In looking at the electricity 
sector, if investors simply ignore the distant targets and proceed as if all that mattered were 
targets through 2030, then they would not begin the transformation that was actually needed to 
meet the long term targets.   
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We then consider several alternative assumptions about the cost and availability of nuclear, 
CCS, and renewables.  We find that varying the relative costs of these over what we think are 
sensible ranges does not have a large effect on the overall cost to the economy.  If one or another 
of these generation sources is assumed to be costly or unavailable, other options are available for 
greater expansion and some of the reduction task can be shifted to other parts of the economy.  
Obviously, assuming nothing would work or that a miracle happens and a costless way to 
produce energy without carbon comes along would give a very costly or a very cheap solution, 
but there is not much sense in simulating such fantasy scenarios.  The important lesson is that a 
broad cap-and-trade system will let the market choose the set of options that is least costly, and 
so if any one or two are available the costs will remain under control. Policies that instead 
attempt to pick particular technologies run the risk of picking ones that may not pan out and 
those approaches to mitigation would then be more costly. 
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APPENDIX: Detailed Results 
 
* Only a sample page is attached here. The full version of the Appendix in Excel format is 
available at: http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt173_AppendixA.xls. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
ECONOMY WIDE INDICATORS
Population (billion) 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.41 0.44
GDP (trillion 2005$) 11.09 13.25 17.48 22.57 29.25 37.53
% Change GDP from Reference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Market Consumption (trillion 2005$) 7.77 9.03 11.83 15.16 19.59 25.09
% Change Consumption from Reference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Welfare (trillion 2005$) 9.12 10.62 14.30 18.67 24.23 31.12
% Change Welfare from Reference (EV) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CO2-E Price (2005$/tCO2-e) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PRICES     
Oil (2005$/barrel) 32.00 65.09 88.20 120.47 142.83 159.32
Natural Gas (2005$/GJ) 4.40 6.75 8.08 10.21 13.66 18.35
Coal (2005$/GJ) 1.50 1.46 1.55 1.62 1.71 1.80
Electricity (2005$/kWh) 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13
GHG EMISSIONS (GT CO2-e)
GHG Emissions 6.96 6.96 7.59 8.17 9.22 10.74
CO2 Emissions 5.85 5.90 6.50 7.02 8.03 9.45
CH4 Emissions 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56
N2O Emissions 0.42 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.28 0.29
Fluorinated Gases Emissions 0.13 0.19 0.28 0.39 0.48 0.59
     HFCs 0.10 0.16 0.25 0.37 0.46 0.57
     PFCs 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
     SF6 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
PRIMARY ENERGY USE (EJ)
Oil 40.2 41.4 45.8 48.7 54.9 62.5
Gas w/o CCS 21.8 22.3 24.3 25.1 24.8 23.7
Gas w/ CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coal w/o CCS 22.7 22.2 24.4 27.5 33.3 39.7
Coal w/ CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Biomass Liquids (primary energy eq) 1.0 2.1 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.1
Nuclear (primary energy eq) 8.3 8.9 8.5 8.2 8.1 8.0
Total Non-Biomass Renewables (prim en eq) 3.0 4.3 5.2 5.9 5.7 5.8
     Wind (primary energy eq) 0.0 1.2 2.1 2.8 2.6 2.5
     Solar (primary energy eq) 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
     Hydro (primary energy eq) 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0
Total Primary Energy Use 97.0 101.1 109.9 117.5 129.3 142.8
Reduced Use from Reference 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Oil 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Gas w/o CCS 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1
Gas w/ CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coal w/o CCS 6.7 7.0 8.1 9.3 11.5 14.0
Coal w/ CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Biomass 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nuclear 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Total Non-Biomass Renewables 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.2 2.2 2.2
     Wind 0.0 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9
     Solar 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
     Hydro 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2
Total Electricity Production 13.0 13.8 15.3 17.0 19.2 21.8
Carbon Storage (GT CO2-e) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Reference
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION (EJ)
Appendix B: Measuring the Cost of Climate Policy* 
Sergey Paltsev, John M. Reilly, Henry D. Jacoby and Jennifer F. Morris 
This note provides an overview of different measures of costs of climate policy. While in our 
studies we stress emissions prices and welfare changes, here we illustrate the measures in most 
common use, showing results for the 167 bmt scenario from Paltsev et al (2009). Similar results 
for the other scenarios can be derived from Appendix A to that report. These are studies of 
mitigation costs only and do not consider climate benefits and potential ancillary non-climate 
benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation, e.g., through reduced urban air pollution. 
1. Emissions Price 
A price on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is usually stated per metric ton of CO2, or in the 
case of multiple gases, per metric ton of CO2-equivalent, or CO2-e. Such a price may be 
established through a market that develops for emissions allowances issued under a cap-and-
trade system (the allowance price) or through an emissions tax set directly by a regulating 
agency. Because CO2 is the largest contributor among the long-lived greenhouse gases, the   
CO2-e concept has come to be widely used. CO2-e prices use Global Warming Potential (GWP) 
indices that take account of the different lifetimes and direct climate effects to calculate the 
amount of CO2 that would have the same effect as, for example, a ton of methane or nitrous 
oxide.1 Since the GWP index uses CO2 as the numeraire (i.e., its index value is 1.0), there is no 
difference in CO2 or CO2-e prices for CO2. The value of the CO2-e measure is that it makes 
prices for other GHGs comparable, in terms of the warming avoided per ton, to that of CO2. An 
example of CO2-e prices for the 167 bmt scenario is provided in Table B1. 
Table B1. CO2-e Price. 
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
CO2-E Price 
(2005$/tCO2-e) 
70.68 104.62 154.86 229.23 
Emissions prices measure marginal cost, that is, the cost of an additional unit of emissions 
reduction. Emissions prices are an indicator of the relative scarcity of the allowances compared 
with the demand for them, but they are not a measure of “total cost” to the economy. Just as, for 
example, the price of a gallon of milk does not provide an indication of the total cost of all the 
                                                 
* This is an appendix to Paltsev et al. (2009): The Cost of Climate Policy in the United States, MIT Joint Program on 
the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 173 
(http://globalchange.mit.edu/pubs/abstract.php?publication_id=1965). 
1 The convention in recent years has been to report prices per ton of CO2. An earlier convention was to report prices 
in tons of C—counting only the carbon weight in the CO2 molecule. A residual effect of this earlier convention 
is to sometimes see a reference to the “carbon price” applied even in the case where the price is stated per ton of 
CO2 rather than per ton C. To convert from a per ton C price to a per ton CO2 price multiply by the molecular 
weight of the CO2 molecule (44) divided by the molecular weight of the carbon atom (12), or 3.667. A price of 
$27.27/ton CO2 is thus the same as $100/ton C. 
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milk produced in the country. That is, prices convey no information about the physical volumes 
to which they apply or the magnitude of the cost compared to the level of activity (e.g., size of 
the firm or of the total economy). Just as the total cost of milk production depends on how much 
milk was produced, the total cost to the economy of greenhouse gas emissions reduction policy 
depends on how much reduction occurred. Note that what is being “produced” with a cap-and-
trade system is abatement of emissions, i.e., emissions reduction. Determining the emissions 
reduction requires an assessment of what emissions would have been without the policy, whereas 
with milk production we can simply measure how much milk was produced.2 Prices can also be 
a misleading indicator of the cost when they interact with other policies and measures — either 
those directed at greenhouse gas reduction (for example, renewable portfolio standards or 
subsidies to carbon-free technologies) or simply other policy instruments such as other taxes on 
energy, labor, or capital. This is no different than for other prices in the economy — our price of 
milk, for example. If there are no other policy measures, the price of milk will fully reflect the 
marginal cost, but if there are farm subsidies or price supports, the milk price will be a poor 
indicator of the marginal cost. 
2. Welfare Change 
For many economists the preferred measure of total economic cost of greenhouse gas 
abatement or of other policy measures is the change in consumer welfare3, measured in terms of 
“equivalent variation”, as this measure considers the GHG price and the amount of abatement 
and can include the effect of interactions with other policy measures to the extent these other 
policy measures are modeled. And, whereas the CO2 price measures the marginal cost, a welfare 
measure takes into account the fact that many of the reductions likely cost less than the last ton 
abated. Welfare is also generally a measure that is broader than just market activity and as such 
the change in welfare includes changes in both labor and leisure time. Leisure is considered a 
good and in models like EPPA it is represented by the monetary value of the non-working time. 
In coming up with a measure of change in welfare any reductions (increases) in the amount of 
work time are offset by increases (decreases) in the amount of leisure time. The welfare change 
in the 167 bmt scenario is provided in Table B2. 
Table B2. Welfare Change. 
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
% Change 
Welfare from 
Reference (EV) 
-0.63 -1.52 -2.32 -2.52 
Many features of the EPPA model (level of aggregation, nesting structure, elasticities, etc.) 
affect this result, but a couple of features are worth special mention. One is the influence of the 
                                                 
2 The caution here is to avoid the temptation to estimate the cost to the economy on the basis of how many 
allowances were issued, which is directly observable.  
3 Change is measured in comparison to welfare without a climate policy. 
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tax interaction effect.4 A price on greenhouse gases will increase producers’ costs, effectively 
reducing the real returns to the factors of production, such as capital, labor, and energy. If, as is 
common, there are pre-existing taxes on these factors, the GHG price has the effect of an 
increase in factor taxes, compounding the distortion caused by the prior tax system. This tax 
interaction effect will influence both the net government revenue from an allowance auction or 
emissions tax and the welfare effect of the policy. This is an effect missed by single-sector 
analyses of environmental policy. It is, however, captured by the EPPA model (subject to 
possible limitations imposed by its level of sectoral aggregation) because of its multi-sector 
general equilibrium structure and the fact that pre-existing taxes are included in the underlying 
data base.5 
A second feature concerns the effect of assumptions about the distribution of auction 
proceeds from a cap-and-trade system or the revenue from an emissions tax. In the EPPA model, 
a single agent represents the demands and behavior of the consumer side of the economy, and the 
value of emissions allowances (or tax revenue) is assumed to be returned to this representative 
consumer in a lump-sum transfer, equivalent to giving the allowances away for free in a lump 
sum manner. With lump-sum distribution the auction or tax revenues do not, by themselves, 
change the amount of total tax revenue or the size of the government. However, because overall 
economic activity (which is the tax base for all other taxes) is generally lower under a policy, the 
amount of total tax revenue and the size of a government will be lower unless tax rates are raised 
to compensate for the drop in the tax base. In analyses conducted here, we hold tax rates constant 
and allow the size of government revenue and expenditures to vary. 
Many other assumptions about auction and tax revenue are possible and would lead to 
different estimates of welfare change. For example, if rather than lump-sum redistribution the 
revenue is used to reduce other taxes, the effect will be to lower the welfare cost because it 
reduces the distortionary effect of these taxes.6 Free distribution of allowances raises the 
possibility that one may need to raise other tax rates to keep the total tax revenue constant so that 
the existing level of government can be maintained, and the higher taxes will increase the 
welfare cost by increasing the distortionary effect of these taxes. If, on the other hand, revenue is 
used for other purposes—e.g., supporting research and development (R&D), subsidizing low-
emitting technologies, compensating low income consumers or affected industries, or funding 
unrelated government programs—then the welfare cost will depend on how effectively the funds 
are spent. If revenue is used for R&D, which is effectively directed to projects with high returns, 
welfare effects can be positive. But if allowance or tax revenue is spent on poorly managed 
programs of the little value, then the funds will be mostly wasted, raising the welfare cost. The 
value of government expenditure are difficult to measure and so there are widely differing views 
on whether and under what circumstances additional revenue can be used effectively. The debate 
                                                 
4 For a summary of issues that arise in assessment of the cost of environmental policies see Goulder (2000). 
5 For an example of this effect, when a carbon charge is imposed on top of high fuel taxes, see Paltsev et al. (2004). 
6 A perfect foresight version of the EPPA model has been applied to exploration of the use of such revenue to the 
reduction of labor and/or capital taxes, see Gurgel et al. (2007) and Babiker et al. (2008). 
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on use of GHG auction or tax revenue taps into the conventional debate about the appropriate 
size and role of the government. Other cost measures, described below, are similarly influenced 
by the tax interaction effect and assumptions about revenue and/or permit distribution. 
3. Consumption Change 
Changes in macroeconomic consumption as a measure of cost is closely related to welfare 
changes described above. The only difference is that consumption change considers only the 
market impacts and so excludes changes in leisure time (i.e., the monetary value of the change in 
non-working time) that occur in response to the policy. The consumption change is usually larger 
than the welfare change because an increase in the price of consumption (due to an increase in 
energy prices) leads to a reallocation of time to non-market activities. The magnitude of the shift 
depends on the labor supply elasticity. Also, consumption change in percentage terms is higher 
than the welfare measure in percentage terms because the base (total consumption) excludes a 
value of leisure time and so the base against which the percentage is calculated is lower. The 
consumption change in the 167 bmt scenario is provided in Table B3. 
Table B3. Consumption Change. 
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
% Change 
Consumption 
from Reference 
-1.13 -2.24 -3.25 -3.49 
4. GDP Change 
The change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is a measure of cost often used by non-
economists because GDP is the measure of economic activity that is most familiar to a general 
audience. It is a less satisfactory indicator of cost than welfare loss or consumption change for 
several reasons. It is useful to recognize that GDP is defined as Consumption (as in Section 3 
above) + Investment + Government + (Exports-Imports). The welfare and consumption measures 
are preferred by economists because they measure the amount of goods people consume. GDP is 
a measure of output, which is not necessarily consumption. Investment goods produced in a 
given year add to the availability of consumption goods over many years and hence changes in 
investment are not directly comparable to a loss of consumption in a year. Government is not a 
final consumer but through transfer programs (e.g., Social Security) or provision of public 
services (e.g. education and police) provides money or goods and services to final consumers. As 
for international trade, how many foreign goods can be bought for a given amount of domestic 
money is more relevant to consumption than the net of exports over imports. The amount of 
foreign goods depends on how the terms-of-trade (i.e., the price of domestic to foreign goods) 
changes. Higher terms-of-trade means we can purchase more foreign goods for every dollar, 
whereas deteriorating terms-of-trade means we can purchase less. As climate policy affects 
energy prices, for large energy exporters or importers these trade effects may be substantial but 
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are not captured by the GDP measure as normally computed. Moreover, what is relevant for 
welfare is the consumption of the imports and how income from exports is used for consumption 
today or for investment and future consumption. Direct consumption of imports by households 
(and indirect use of imports through their use as intermediate inputs to domestic goods) is 
included in the measure of consumption described in Section 3. Any net export income that is 
saved and invested contributes to future consumption. While many of these changes net out, 
GDP changes can lead to double counting of the cost of a policy, particularly if GDP impacts 
over time are considered. Then the change in investment is counted in the year when investment 
is affected (i.e., reduced) because it is part of GDP, and that effect is counted again in future 
years as reduced consumption because of the lower capital stock due to less investment in earlier 
years. The GDP changes in the 167 bmt scenario are provided in Table B4. 
Table B4. GDP Change. 
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
% Change GDP 
from Reference 
-1.45 -2.45 -3.34 -3.70 
5. Per Capita and Per Family Costs 
Whereas we reported the above changes in welfare, consumption and GDP as percentage 
changes, these can also be converted into absolute dollar levels and then divided by population or 
the number of households to arrive at a per capita or per household cost. This measure can then 
be compared with GDP per capita7 or household income and may be a number that is more 
compelling to the average person or family. The GDP per capita cost in the 167 bmt scenario is 
provided in Table B5.8 A similar per capita calculation can be made for welfare or consumption. 
Costs per household are similar where instead of dividing by population one divides by the 
number of households (or by population and then multiply by average household size or for 
different assumed household sizes — family of four for instance). Table B6 provides a cost for a 
household with a family size of four and family size of 2.57 (an average U.S. household size in 
2005). A similar calculation for household welfare change can be made for households of 
different sizes. 
                                                 
7 This study focuses on the US. Sometimes there is an interest in comparing absolute costs among countries. For this 
reason it is important to consider the relative purchasing power of different currencies as market exchange rates 
are highly variable and can provide misleading indication of relative well-being among countries. To reflect 
differences in relative incomes among countries when incomes are expressed in common monetary units, several 
indexes can be constructed. The most popular is a purchasing-power parity (PPP) index. Conventionally in using 
these indices the U.S is set to 1.0, so per capita GDP measured at PPP or at market-exchange rates is the same. 
For other countries these two measures may differ. Although widely accepted estimates of current PPP rates are 
available, there is no standard method for projecting how they may change in the future. 
8 All the caveats about the GDP measure described in Section 4 are applied here as well. The GDP calculation is 
provided here for illustrative purposes to compare with a popular measure of GDP per capita. As discussed 
above, welfare and consumption calculations are preferred. 
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Table B5. GDP Per Capita Cost. 
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
Population (billion) 0.34 0.37 0.41 0.44 
Reference GDP  
(trillion 2005$) 
17.48 22.57 29.25 37.53 
Policy GDP  
(trillion 2005$) 
17.23 22.02 28.28 36.15 
Change in GDP from 
Reference  
(trillion 2005$) 
-0.25 -0.55 -0.98 -1.39 
Reference Per capita GDP 
(2005$) 
51271 60513 72050 85496 
Per capita GDP cost 
(2005$) 
745 1480 2405 3160 
Table B6. Change in Household Consumption.  
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
Reference Consumption  
   (trillion 2005$) 
11.83 15.16 19.59 25.09 
Policy Consumption  
   (trillion 2005$) 
11.70 14.82 18.95 24.22 
Change in Consumption  
   (trillion 2005$) 
-0.13 -0.34 -0.64 -0.88 
Change in Consumption 
per family of 4 (2005$) 
-1565 -3635 -6279 -7983 
Change per U.S. Average 
Household Consumption 
(2005$) 
-1005 -2336 -4034 -5129 
6. Discounted Costs 
Climate policies are typically specified over a period of several years or even decades, and 
because the level of the policy is changing over time the costs are changing from year to year. To 
compare costs over time, conventional economic practices apply a discounts rate to future costs 
on the basis that money today would earn a return over time. One also may be interested in a 
summary measure of the cost to be borne over the life of the policy. A useful measure is thus the 
average annual discounted GDP, welfare, or consumption change either as a percentage, an 
aggregate total or per household. A key variable in this calculation is a discount rate, i.e., how 
much less we value the future payments in comparison to the present payments of the same size, 
and there are different views on what the appropriate rate is for climate policy (see, for example, 
Nordhaus (2007) for a discussion about a discount rate). Table B7 provides the discounted 
household welfare to 2005 using a 4% discount rate, for the policy effects to 2050, for an 
average U.S. household. One can also calculate an average discounted welfare change for a 
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certain period of time (which, for 2020-2050, is a reduction of $700 compared to an average 
discounted household welfare of about $44,000 in the 167 bmt scenario). A similar calculation 
for a discounted GDP and consumption change can be made. A related measure is a net present 
value (NPV) of welfare (consumption, GDP) or welfare change, where all variables are summed 
over a certain period and discounted to the present values. 
Table B7. Discounted Household Welfare Change. 
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
Reference Welfare  
(trillion 2005$) 
14.30 18.67 24.23 31.12 
Policy Welfare  
(trillion 2005$) 
14.21 18.38 23.67 30.33 
Change in Welfare  
(trillion 2005$) 
-0.09 -0.28 -0.56 -0.78 
Change per U.S. Average 
Household Welfare 
(2005$) 
-680 -1960 -3564 -4582 
Change per U.S. Average 
Household Welfare 
(2005$), discounted to 
2005 at 4 percent 
-378 -735 -903 -784 
7. Change in Energy Prices  
Prices of all goods will change in the economy as a result of climate policy, and in response 
to these changes consumers will adjust their consumption of goods. Climate policy will have the 
strongest effect on energy prices as fossil-based fuels will have an additional charge due to their 
carbon content and that change in price can have strong effects on the demand for these fuels. As 
a result, there is often interest in how fuel and electricity prices will change. That said, it is 
important to note that changes in energy prices are not a cost in addition to those discussed above 
(welfare, GDP, consumption): to the extent fuel and electricity price increases lead to an increase 
expenditure on energy by consumers or reduce the income and rents received by producers of 
energy, these effects are captured in broader measures of economic cost discussed above.  
CO2 pricing will in general increase the wedge between the prices consumers pay (which 
includes the CO2 charge) and the price producers receive for fuels. Consumers will face higher 
CO2-inclusive prices for energy and reduce their demand for fossil fuels. This will tend to lower 
the producer price received for fuels. Table B8 provides energy prices in the reference (i.e., no 
climate policy) scenario, producer prices (exclusive of carbon charge), and consumer prices 
(inclusive of carbon charge) in the case of the 167 bmt policy. The consumer prices are 
calculated based on the CO2 price and the carbon content of the fuel, here using factors from the 
US CCSP scenario study (see Table 4.7 in US CCSP, 2007). Electricity price effects depend on 
abatement costs and CO2 emissions from electricity which change significantly because the 
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intent of the policy is to greatly reduce these emissions. EPPA models the impact on the 
electricity price directly. 
Table B8. Energy Prices. 
Natural Gas 
Price ($/tcf) 
Reference Policy 
Producer 
Price 
Policy 
Consumer 
Price 
2010 7.09 7.09 7.09 
2020 7.70 6.85 10.75 
2030 9.72 8.55 14.32 
2040 13.01 9.36 17.90 
2050 17.47 9.10 21.75 
Crude Oil 
price ($/bbl) 
Reference Policy 
Producer 
Price 
Policy 
Consumer 
Price 
2010 65.09 65.09 65.09 
2020 88.20 82.10 114.03 
2030 120.47 109.45 156.72 
2040 142.83 125.28 195.26 
2050 159.32 139.20 242.78 
Coal Price 
($/short ton) 
Reference Policy 
Producer 
Price 
Policy 
Consumer 
Price 
2010 32.23 32.23 32.23 
2020 34.00 31.17 175.93 
2030 35.70 30.67 244.95 
2040 37.59 31.13 348.31 
2050 39.71 32.06 501.56 
Electricity 
Price 
(c/kWh) 
Reference  Policy 
Consumer 
Price 
2010 9.14   9.14 
2020 10.82   16.21 
2030 12.05   18.49 
2040 12.49   18.97 
2050 12.85   19.02 
 
8. Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) 
A Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve is a relationship between tons of emissions abated 
and the CO2 (or GHG) price. Under highly simplified assumptions, the area under a MAC curve 
provides an estimate of total cost — but this is best seen as the direct cost of abatement 
undertaken in that year as it does not capture distortion costs and terms-of-trade effects among 
other economy-wide effects (for a discussion, see for example, Paltsev et al., 2004). MACs 
derived from the EPPA model are described in detail in Morris et al. (2008). Some studies show 
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a negative part of MACs, like, for example McKinsey and Co analysis (2007), where “almost 40 
percent of abatement could be achieved at ‘negative’ marginal costs”. Jacoby (1998) discusses 
some of the ways such bottom-up based engineering studies can be misleading as a guide to an 
economy-wide policy. For more on a comparison of EPPA and a McKinsey MAC curve, see 
Appendix B of the MIT Joint Program Report 164 (available at: 
http://globalchange.mit.edu/pubs/abstract.php?publication_id=972).  
In economy-wide modeling studies, zero cost or beneficial efficiency improvements are 
recognized through an exogenous energy efficiency improvement over time and so these are 
captured in the reference/no policy scenario. Thus, they do not appear as part of a policy scenario 
and, therefore, a MAC constructed from an economy-wide model generally does not have a 
negative cost component. However, in countries with positive terms-of-trade effects or if auction 
revenue is used to cut existing distortionary taxes, there can be welfare gains from climate policy 
even with a positive CO2 price, especially for smaller reductions (e.g., see Babiker et al., 2003). 
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 Appendix C: Cost of Climate Policy and the Waxman-Markey  
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454)1 
Sergey Paltsev, John M. Reilly, Henry D. Jacoby and Jennifer F. Morris 
 
Abstract 
The American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R.2454) passed the House of Representatives 
after the completion of the main report (MIT Joint Program Report 173). In this Appendix we provide 
an analysis of the Act’s provisions as they relate to key features governing the cap-and-trade system, 
the renewable electricity standard (RES), limits on new coal power plants and support for carbon 
capture and storage(CCS), applying the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model 
used in the main report. While the overall economy-wide target in H.R. 2454, of no more than 161 
billion metric tons of CO2-equivalent released through 2050, is similar to the 167 bmt case analyzed 
in the main report, other features of the Bill significantly affect projections of its cost. We find that the 
large allowance for outside credits could reduce the cost if indeed these are forthcoming (and 
inexpensive). Other provisions, such as how the revenue and allowances will be distributed, will have 
important distributional consequences as well, but their analysis is beyond the scope of the study 
presented here.  
Our central estimate shows the CO2-e price starting at $21 per ton in 2015 and rising to about 
$84 by 2050. We decompose the welfare costs into a total cost including H.R. 2454 and recent 
legislation that was motivated in part for its GHG benefits (the Energy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007 and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009) vs. the additional cost of H.R 2454 
itself given these preexisting measures. The national welfare cost of reaching the emissions targets 
outlined in H.R. 2454, attributable to the bill itself, rise from about 0.1 percent to 1.45 percent over 
the period 2015-2050. We estimate average annual net present value cost of H.R. 2454 of about $400 
per household over this horizon, but given different assumptions about the availability of offsets this 
estimate ranges from as low as $180 to as high as $470. A rough comparison of costs with analyses 
by the CBO, EIA and EPA shows results in the same general range, though our estimates are higher. 
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1 This is an appendix to Paltsev et al. (2009): The Cost of Climate Policy in the United States, MIT Joint Program on 
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 C1. FEATURES OF H.R. 2454 AND IMPLEMENTATION IN THE EPPA MODEL 
We rely on a version of the bill as passed by the House of Representatives on June 26, 2009, 
recognizing that final legislation will depend on details of a Senate bill and reconciliation with 
the House version. H.R. 2454 is composed of five main titles. Title I deals with clean energy, 
setting up a combined efficiency and renewable electricity standard as well assistance for various 
advanced technologies. Title II focuses further on energy efficiency, creating a number of 
programs and standards for buildings, lighting, and appliances. Title III establishes a cap-and-
trade system for greenhouse gases (GHGs). Title IV addresses the transition to a clean economy 
and competitiveness issues. Title V deals with agricultural and forestry related offsets.  
General Provisions 
Title III, establishing the cap-and-trade system, is the main focus of our analysis. The cap 
covers seven GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O, 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), and nitrogen 
trifluoride (NF3). Covered entities include large stationary sources emitting more than 25,000 
tons of GHGs per year, producers (i.e., refineries) and importers of all petroleum fuels, 
distributors of natural gas to residential, commercial and small industrial users (i.e., local gas 
distribution companies), producers of “F-gases,” and other specified sources. The cap is intended 
to ultimately cover 84.5% of total U.S. GHG emissions. The cap gradually reduces aggregate 
GHG emissions for all covered entities to 3% below 2005 levels in 2012, 17% below 2005 levels 
in 2020, 42% below 2005 levels in 2030, and 83% below 2005 levels in 2050. Commercial 
production and imports of HFCs are to be covered under a separate cap, which we do not assess.  
Previous analysis of such a separation suggests that it raises the costs of meeting the targets by a 
substantial amount considering that HFC emissions represent a small share of the GHG total. 
The bill also establishes economy-wide goals for all sources. 
For the capped sectors, the bill lays out year-by-year allowances.  We simplify the policy by 
assuming that a cap-and-trade system covers all emissions, and so the allowance path is 
prescribed to align with the economy-wide reduction goals laid out in the bill: 80% of 2005 
levels by 2020, 58% by 2030, and 17% by 2050. We thus assume that measures directed at 
sectors not covered by the cap will be effective at achieving reductions, in a manner as 
economically efficient as if they were under the cap (i.e. the marginal costs of reduction in the 
capped and uncapped sectors would be comparable). With banking and borrowing, the most 
important aspect of the allowance path is its cumulative emissions over the life of the policy 
(2012-2050), which are 161 billion metric tons (or, gigatons, Gt) CO2-e. Since the cap and trade 
system is covering an estimated 85% of US emissions we expect the additional 15% coverage to 
have a relatively small effect on the overall costs.  Allowances for covered sectors alone amount 
to 132 Gt CO2-e of cumulative emissions. The allowance path and economy-wide goals are 
presented in Figure C1.  The highly non-linear sectoral allowance path in the early years reflects 
the fact that not all sectors are immediately covered by the cap, and so actual allowances are 
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 proportionately lower. In our simplified path, representing the national economy goals, all 
sectors are covered from the start. 
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Figure C1.  Allowance Allocation for Covered Sectors and National Emissions Goals. 
Cost Containment 
Several cost-containment measures are included in the bill. Up to two billion tons (or 
gigatons—Gt) of credit offsets can be used each year in lieu of allowances—1 Gt from domestic 
sources and 1Gt from international sources. However, if the domestic supply of offsets is 
insufficient, EPA can raise the international limit up to 1.5 Gt, but the 2 Gt total limit still 
applies. For international offsets, beginning in 2018, 1.25 offset credits would be required for 
each ton of emissions compliance. The EPA would determine the list of eligible offset projects 
based on recommendations from an Offsets Integrity Advisory Board. Title V of the bill 
establishes an offset program specific to domestic agriculture and forestry sources, to be 
administered by the Secretary of Agriculture.   
While credits are allowed, the actual amount forthcoming in any year will depend on how 
they are defined, the extent to which their definition will avoid the traditional bureaucracy of 
credit programs, and the competition for them from foreign cap-and-trade programs.  Until these 
features are resolved one can only speculate on how they will influence offset supply.  We thus 
consider two offset paths:  
(1) Full Offsets - we add 2 Gt to the total national allowances in each year, at a specified cost 
per ton CO2-e.  
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 (2) Medium Offsets - we impose a gradual path of offset use that builds up to 2 Gt by 2050, 
similarly at a specified cost.  
The reasoning behind the latter path is that, even if the full level of offsets were available, the 
process of setting up a program to evaluate and approve them will be slow. Under these 
assumptions, cumulative emissions within the U.S. national cap are 239 Gt CO2-e from 2012 to 
2050 with full offsets and 203 Gt CO2-e with medium offsets. These allowance-plus-offset paths 
are presented in Figure C2. To indicate the effect of the offset provision on the mitigation task, 
the allowed emissions path if there were no offsets is also shown in the figure. 
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Figure C2.  National Emissions Goals with Alternative Offset Paths. 
 
We further assume offsets have a cost to the economy, and implement this assumption by 
transferring abroad the value of allowances purchased internationally. Our default assumption is 
that the average cost of these credits is $5 per effective ton of offsets CO2-e in 2015, rising at 4% 
per year thereafter.2 Later we provide the results with alternative assumptions about the cost of 
offsets: $15 per ton at the start and if available at no cost throughout. 
Another cost containment provision is banking and borrowing.  In the bill, banking of 
allowances is unlimited and a two-year compliance period allows unlimited borrowing from one 
                                                 
2 The bill specifies that 1.25 tons of foreign reductions are required to produce 1 ton of effective offsets.  The $5/ton 
initial offset price means the actual payment per ton of foreign reduction is $4. 
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 year ahead without penalty. Limited borrowing (15%) from two to five years ahead is also 
allowed, but with interest. We consider the allowance banking and borrowing provisions in our 
analysis.  In general, we find no need for aggregate borrowing, and so there is no need to 
implement an explicit restriction on it. Also included in the bill is a strategic allowance reserve 
auction that sets aside a small percentage of allowances (1% in 2012-2019, 2% in 2020-2029, 
and 3% in 2030-2050) to be auctioned to contain short run allowance price spikes. The initial 
minimum price level for the auction would be set at $28 in 2012, and rise at 5% plus inflation for 
2013 and 2014. Beginning in 2015, the reserve auction trigger price would be 60% above the 
rolling 36-month average of the market price of allowances. There are additional limits on the 
amount auctioned from the reserve each year and the amount each entity can purchase.  The 
EPPA model simulates the economy on 5-year time steps and so it is not possible for us to 
consider the short-run dynamics under which this provision might be important. We assume all 
of this reserve is released to the market. 
Title III also describes how allowances will be distributed, either through an auction or 
distribution at no cost.  A large portion of allowances or auction revenues are distributed so as to 
return the value to lower and middle income households and to offset increases in energy costs.  
Emission allowances are also distributed to aid energy intensive, trade-vulnerable industries and 
domestic refiners and to support investment in clean technologies including carbon capture and 
storage (CCS), advanced vehicle technology, and energy R&D through various mechanisms 
including funding a State Energy and Environmental Development (SEED) program. These 
features of the bill are important in determining its distributional effects among income groups, 
but because EPPA has a single representative agent, they are not relevant to our analysis.  
Renewables and Efficiency 
Title I lays out a combined efficiency and renewable electricity standard which requires retail 
electric suppliers that sell more than 4 million megawatt hours of electricity to meet a growing 
percentage of their load with electricity generated from renewable resources and from electricity 
savings. The combined renewable electricity and electricity savings requirement begins at 6% in 
2012 and gradually rises to 20% in 2020, where it stays until 2039.  An interesting and 
potentially important aspect of the bill is the calculation of the base against which this percentage 
applies. In particular, the base is total electricity production minus: (1) electricity from non-
qualified hydroelectric facilities, (2) electricity from nuclear generation built after the passage of 
this bill, (3) the proportion of electricity generated from fossil fuel plants that is equal to the 
proportion of GHGs those plants capture and geologically store, and (4) electricity from small 
utilities (those that sell less than 4 million MWh per year).3 If RES requirement is not met there 
is an Alternative Compliance Payment of $25 per MWh (2.5 cents per kWh).  
                                                 
3 The characteristics of the base are crucial to the economics of this provision.  For example, if the cap-and-trade 
policy led to complete phase out of fossil generation at some point, replaced by nuclear and fossil with CCS, the 
requirement would be 20% of a base of zero. 
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  With regard to the shares of renewables and efficiency improvement, the bill specifies that 
75% of the requirement should be met by renewable energy while the remainder can come from 
reductions in electricity demand. The Federal Regulatory Commission can lower the renewables 
share to 60% upon petition from a state governor, but we do not consider this method of relaxing 
the target in our simulations. For purposes of simulating the renewable electricity standard (RES) 
in EPPA, the first simulation year is 2015, at which point the bill sets the RES at 9.5%, and this 
rises to 20% in 2020-2039. We further assume the target of 20% extends to 2050. In modeling 
the expansion of renewables required by the combined efficiency and renewables standard we 
take account of renewable supply that may already be in place in the baseline due to state RES 
programs and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 by implementing an 
estimate drawn from analysis by the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2009). 
The Bill does not specify a method for defining the contribution of electric demand reduction. 
It is possible to imagine its measurement, alternatively, in terms of the absolute reduction from 
the base-year level, as the reduction from a forecast baseline, or as the estimated savings from 
utility demand management programs. We model the contribution as the reduction from our 
projected, no-policy baseline. Reductions in excess of the contribution required to meet the 
efficiency component of RES can occur in our simulations simply because of the pass-through of 
higher generation costs in the electricity price. In these circumstances this 25% of the RES target 
is met through these electricity savings, at no additional cost.  
Other Provisions 
Sec. 782 of H.R. 2454 requires that a certain percentage of allowances in each year go toward 
the deployment of CCS technology. That percentage is 1.75% in 2015 and 5% in 2020-2050. To 
model this provision, we multiply the number of allowances going to CCS each year by the 
carbon price in that year and give the resulting amount of money to CCS technologies as a 
subsidy. We did not model additional bonus allowance provisions for CCS specified in the bill. 
We have modeled the performance standards for coal-fueled power plants as specified in Sec. 
116 by ensuring that no new coal plants without CCS are built after 2025.  
The bill has still other provisions that we do not consider. Other sections of Title I and Title II 
provide supports for energy efficiency and advanced technologies other than coal with CCS. 
Title I establishes State Energy and Environment Development (SEED) Accounts for energy 
efficiency and renewable energy deployment, and promotes clean energy investment, smart grid 
advancement and transmission planning and siting. Title II sets energy efficiency standards for 
buildings, lighting, appliances, and transportation and requires EPA to promulgate carbon 
emission standards for heavy-duty vehicles and off-road vehicles, such as construction 
equipment, trains, and large ships. These details are mostly below the level of detail of the EPPA 
model.  Some of these features of the bill may be important for removing barriers to adoption of 
new technologies. Others may set standards that are redundant, given that the economy-wide cap 
will require substantial gains even without these standards. In general, the EPPA model assumes 
barriers will be overcome and so if these additional programs are an essential part of making that 
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 happen, any program costs associated with them are an additional macroeconomic cost beyond 
what we estimate in the model. If they go beyond what the cap would require, then they also 
would add to the cost by diverting abatement action to these more costly activities.  
C2. ESTIMATES OF EMISSIONS PRICE AND COST UNDER H.R. 2454 
We turn now to our estimates of the impacts of H.R. 2454 in terms of actual emissions 
reductions, CO2-e prices, economy-wide welfare costs, and costs per average household.  For a 
discussion of these and other cost concepts, see Appendix B of this report.  Note that our analysis 
encompasses only the cost of emissions mitigation and so does not consider potential welfare 
improvements from ancillary benefits of emissions mitigation or from climate damages avoided. 
Our main results include the RES requirement and the cost of acquiring offsets.  Because of the 
uncertainty about the offsets we show results for the two offset cases defined above. Later we 
with different assumptions about offset cost. 
We present two views of the cost of the policy measures that would contribute to the 
achievement of the emissions target in H.R. 2454.  A total cost measure includes the influence of 
other measures: the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) which introduced 
biofuels and CAFE standards, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) 
which included subsidies to renewables, and state-level RES policies. This total cost is roughly 
consistent, assuming Medium Offsets, with the 203 bmt case in the main body of this report. The 
analysis of the cost implications of H.R. 2454 then treats the costs of these existing measures as 
sunk and considers only the incremental effort required to bring emissions down to the Bill’s 
specified target. EISA and ARRA measures were implemented explicitly as fuels and technology 
requirements.  As a result they impose a welfare cost on the economy but there is no explicit CO2 
price associated with these measures.  
Emissions 
 Reference and policy emissions are presented in Figure C3. Estimates of the total cost of 
recently-imposed measures and H.R. 2454 are based on the Reference-No Policy baseline. The 
reduction effort required of H.R. 2454 then is defined in terms of a baseline that takes account of 
the reductions attributable to earlier measures, noted in the Figure as Reference+EISA+ARRA. 
Note that the banking of allowances over time leads to the emissions profiles that differ from the 
allowance paths in Figure C2. With banking and offsets the nominal national goal of 17% of 
2005 emissions in 2050 (or 83% reduction) is not actually achieved. In the medium offsets case, 
emissions in 2050 are still about 68% of the 2005 level.  In the full offset case, emissions by 
2050 are about 87% of 2005 emissions.  As long as the credits result in real reductions 
elsewhere, these different scenarios will have essentially the same effect on atmospheric 
concentrations, but they have different implications for what is required in terms of domestic 
changes in energy supply and use. 
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Figure C3.  US GHG Emissions With and Without Policies. 
Prices and Welfare 
 CO2-e price and welfare effects are presented in Figures C4 and C5 and in Table C1. For 
H.R. 2454 with medium offsets the initial price is $21/tCO2-e in 2015 and it rises to around $84 
per tCO2-e by 2050. Carbon prices are lower than in the closest scenario in the main body of the 
report (203 bmt), where the price is projected to rise from $39 to $155. (H.R. 2454 with medium 
offsets and the 203 bmt scenario coincidentally results in the same cumulative emissions over 
2012-2050.) A scenario with the full amount of offsets decreases the 2015 carbon price to $7 
with a price in 2050 of around $29 per ton CO2-e. The welfare costs of H.R. 2454 with medium 
offsets rise from 0.1% in 2015 to 1.45% in 2050, while the total cost of climate policy including 
EISA and ARRA is 0.3% in 2015 rising to 1.73% in 2050, again similar to the 203 bmt scenario, 
where they increase from 0.1% in 2015 to 1.75% in 2050.  
 The costs are higher and carbon prices are lower than the 203 bmt case due to several reasons: 
(1) Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 and American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 introduce biofuels, CAFÉ standards and subsidies to renewables that reduce GHG 
emissions. As a result, they cover a part of the cost of reaching targets specified in H.R. 2454; (2) 
subsidies to CCS and the RES requirements in H.R. 2454 reduce the carbon price but increase 
the welfare cost of the policy (for more discussion of the interaction of renewable electricity 
requirement with a cap-and-trade system, see Morris, 2009); (3) our estimate of U.S. natural gas 
resources has also increased while our estimate of the cost of producing electricity from natural 
gas combined-cycle generation is lower reflecting recent evidence on resources availability and 
generation costs. 
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Figure C4.  Carbon Prices in H.R. 2454 with Different Offsets. 
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Figure C5.  Welfare Change in H.R. 2454 with Different Offsets. 
By the end of the analysis period our different offset assumptions affect the estimates of cost 
substantially.  Our estimates of the cost of H.R. 2454 with full offsets leads to 0.8% welfare loss 
in 2050 while a scenario with medium offsets results in 1.45%.  A similar difference appears in 
welfare costs by 2050 when the total cost of climate policy is considered: – 1.12% in the full 
offsets scenario and 1.73% with medium offsets. More detailed results for the total cost of 
climate policy are provided at the end of this note.  
 Table C1. CO2-e Price and Welfare Cost with Different Offsets. 
H.R. 2454 Total Cost 
Price, $/ton CO2-e Welfare Cost, % Welfare Cost, % 
 
Med 
Offsets 
Full 
Offsets 
Med 
Offsets 
Full 
Offsets 
Med 
Offsets 
Full 
Offsets 
2010 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 
2015 21.31 7.27 -0.07 -0.10 -0.32 -0.35 
2020 25.92 8.85 -0.29 -0.26 -0.64 -0.61 
2025 31.54 10.76 -0.50 -0.35 -0.89 -0.75 
2030 38.37 13.09 -0.79 -0.43 -1.19 -0.83 
2035  46.68 15.93 -1.00 -0.54 -1.39 -0.93 
2040 56.80 19.38 -1.19 -0.67 -1.56 -1.04 
2045 69.10 23.58 -1.38 -0.80 -1.70 -1.12 
2050 84.07 28.69 -1.45 -0.84 -1.73 -1.12 
Cost per Household 
Recent analyses have reported economic cost as a dollar cost per household.  We construct 
this estimate by monetizing the welfare loss and dividing it by the number of households. Table 
C2 provides our calculation for this cost of H.R. 2454, using the U.S. 2005 average of 2.57 
persons per household, and a population of 296 million. We assume the household size stays the 
same over time, with the number of households increasing as population grows. The cost per 
household in 2015 for the medium offsets case is $68 ($97 in the full offset case4).  This rises to 
just over $300 (about $280 in the full offset case) in 2020, and to about $2700 ($1560 in the full 
offset case) per household by 2050.5 On average for the 2012-2050 period, the cost per 
household is between $720 and $1200 depending on the offsets assumption. 
The RES requirement increases the household cost in the first decade of the policy when the 
renewable share must increase rapidly. The rapid phase-in of the RES—from about 7% to 15% 
in just 5 years creates further adjustment costs. The affect of the RES is moderated in later years, 
partly because the constraint is less binding and partly because the cap-and-trade costs continue 
to rise as the target tightens, while the RES requirement remains unchanged. However, larger 
overall losses in early years due to the RES depress the level of saving and investment, and the 
reduction in investment continues to affect the level of the economy in later years even when the 
RES is not binding. 
Also shown is the total household cost of the H.R. 2454 targets when the effects of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA) and American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
                                                 
4 The cost per household is higher in the full offset case in early years but lower over the whole period specified in 
the bill because in early years the payment for the full amount of offsets must be made, while in the medium 
offsets case these offsets are not available and not paid for. As overall emissions reduction is bigger when full 
offsets are not available, the medium offsets case is getting more expensive over time. The exact reduction 
profile is also affected by allowance banking behavior.   
5 To provide a context for these annual costs, the average per-family consumption under the growth scenario 
imposed here, for the medium offsets case, is $90,000 in 2020 and $150,000 in 2050. Naturally, these costs do 
not fall evenly on all families. Indeed, the allowance allocation in H.R. 2454 is designed to lower the price 
impact on low- and middle-income consumers. 
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 are considered. On average for the 2012-2050 period, the total cost per household is between 
$1200 and $1700.  
 To the extent the policy represents a long term commitment it is useful to calculate an average 
annual cost per household over the horizon of the policy.  To do this, we discount costs to 2010 
at 4% to arrive at a net present value of the cost in each year, and then take the average for the 
2015 to 2050 period.  In the medium offsets case, this leads to an average net present value cost 
of H.R. 2454 of about $250 in the full offset case to just over $400 per household in the medium 
offsets case. The corresponding numbers for the total cost of climate policy are about $450 per 
household when full offsets are available and about $600 per household in the scenario with 
medium offsets (for more discussion on the different cost measures, see Section 6 of Appendix B 
to this report). 
Table C2. Cost per Household (in dollars) of H.R. 2454 with Different Offsets, Annual and 
Discounted to 2010 at 4%. 
H.R. 2454 Total Cost 
Med Offsets Full Offsets Med Offsets Full Offsets 
 
Annual Discount 
to 2010 
Annual Discount 
to 2010 
Annual Discount 
to 2010 
Annual Discount 
to 2010 
2010 0 0 0 0 81 81 81 81
2015 68 56 97 80 326 268 355 292
2020 319 215 283 191 704 475 668 451
2025 588 326 419 232 1058 587 889 494
2030 1036 473 556 254 1563 713 1083 494
2035 1433 538 771 289 1994 748 1332 500
2040 1867 576 1043 322 2449 755 1625 501
2045 2354 597 1366 346 2907 737 1918 486
2050 2695 561 1562 325 3225 672 2091 436
Average  1223 404 720 247 1701 607 1198 451
Electricity Generation 
Electricity generation by source for the medium offsets case is presented in Figure C6. The 
reference case, as in the main report, relies heavily on coal.  We find that the main response of 
the electricity sector to the emissions constraint is to shift heavily to natural gas generation. In 
the 203 bmt scenario, presented in Figure 4c of the main report, new nuclear played a large role.  
A change in the EPPA model parameters to reflect an increase in domestic natural gas resources 
and lower NGCC costs contributes to this difference in results between the main report and this 
appendix. The policy also leads to a substantial reduction in electricity use compared to the 
reference case without EISA and ARRA measures, more than enough to contribute the 25% of 
the RES allowed for electricity savings. According to our estimates, EISA and ARRA lead to 
renewables that almost meet the RES requirements in H.R. 2454. In early years (2020-2035) an 
additional 1-3% of the requirement must still be met with H.R.2454 measures. We did not 
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 consider the scenario in which state governors petition to meet 40% of the RES requirement 
through efficiency savings, which would make the requirement non-binding in all years. 
 The bill prohibits new coal plants unless they are far more efficient than existing plants. With 
high enough CO2 prices there would be no economic incentive to build new coal plants.  We 
find, however, that with the EISA, ARRA, and offsets there was considerable new investment in 
conventional coal.  We thus implemented in EPPA limits on new investment in coal plants 
without CCS.  Figure C6 reflects those limits, and hence coal generation drops as old plants are 
retired.  
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Figure C6.  Electricity Generation in H.R. 2454 with Medium Offsets. 
Primary Energy 
 Primary energy by source in the medium offsets case is presented in Figure C7. While the 
share of natural gas increases in the electricity sector substantially as a result of the policy, the 
overall share of natural gas is not increasing as dramatically in the economy as a whole.  Thus 
the more important factor behind the increase in gas in electricity generation is the lower cost of 
NGCC which leads to diversion of gas from other sectors. 
 Petroleum products remain an important energy source for transportation because other 
alternatives (e.g., biofuels) do not increase by enough to meet increasing demand, and hence oil 
consumption remains roughly level, but less than in the reference case6. Reduced energy use, 
shown in Figure C7 and calculated as the difference in total primary energy between the 
reference (without EISA and ARRA) and policy case is a major contributor to meeting the policy 
target.  In the reference, primary energy use increased from about 100 EJ to 140 EJ in 2050 while 
in this policy case total use in 2050 remains at about 100 EJ. 
 
                                                 
6 In a scenario (not shown here) when restrictions on imported biofuels are eliminated and domestic biofuels costs 
are reduced, starting in 2030 most of oil is replaced with biofuels. 
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Figure C7.  Primary Energy Use in H.R. 2454 with Medium Offsets. 
  
 Energy Prices 
Energy prices are presented in Figure C8, where reference (no climate policy) prices and the 
impact of the CO2 charge on producer and consumer prices for fuels are shown. The electricity 
price includes any CO2 charge on fossil fuels still being used and added costs for generation to 
meet the CO2 and RES requirement.   
 Producer prices for fuels tend to fall as demand falls, while consumer prices rise because of 
the embedded CO2 charge. Coal prices inclusive of the CO2 charge grow to about $200 per short 
ton by 2050 from the current prices of just over $30. The producer price falls very little because 
there is little rent in coal resources. Most of the adjustment occurs in the quantity produced. The 
reference case shows a substantial increase in natural gas prices, which grow to about $20 per 
thousand cubic feet (tcf) by 2050. Non-electric sector users reduce gas use in response to the 
CO2 policy, while in the electric sector gas increases as it substitutes for coal, leaving little net 
change in total national use. As a result, the producer prices for gas in H.R. 2454 are not very 
different from the reference level. Consumer prices for gas are higher ($27 per tcf in 2050). Oil 
prices also rise in the no policy case so that by 2050 we estimate prices at $160/barrel. Inclusive 
of the CO2 price, the cost of using oil rises to around $180, while reduced demand leads to a 
producer price that is about $20 per barrel less in 2050 than in the reference. The impacts on 
electricity prices are also substantial and lead to $0.20 per kWh price in the policy scenario 
compared to $0.13 per kWh in the reference case.  
 The bill distributes allowances to local gas and electricity distribution companies. The value 
of these allowances would likely go to rate payers. Whether this would lead to a lower electricity 
and natural gas rates or be distributed in a lump-sum or some other manner is unclear. In our 
study all allowance value is distributed in a lump-sum manner to households, consistent with the 
intent of the legislation to direct allowance value to consumers. If local distribution companies 
choose to use the allowances to lower the rates, the electricity and natural gas prices would be 
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lower that we report here. However, failure to fully reflect carbon cost in rates would reduce the 
efficiency of the program and increase the overall cost of the policy. 
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Figure C8.  Energy Prices in H.R. 2454 with Medium Offsets (reference prices in blue, 
consumer prices in green, and producer prices in red). 
C3. RESULTS WITH DIFFERENT OFFSET COSTS 
 The offset costs are a key uncertainty. Lacking a definition of what would qualify as an offset 
and the potential competition from cap-and-trade systems abroad, little can be done in the way of 
analysis to evaluate the cost of offset supply to the U.S. market. Here we attest the sensitivity of 
our results in two scenarios, one where the costs of offsets start at 15$ per tCO2-e in 2015 and 
rise at 4% and another where there is no cost to offsets. Results for cost per household are 
presented in Table C3.  
 Assuming that offsets would come at no cost reduces the cost per household in 2020 
(discounted to 2010 at 4%) to $127 with Full Offsets and around $202 with Medium Offsets 
(compared to $191 and $215 in the scenario presented in Table C2). The higher cost of offsets 
increases the burden. The corresponding 2020 numbers for the scenario with offsets starting at 
$15 are $223 and $241. For different assumptions about the availability and cost of offsets, the 
cost per household ranges from as low as $180 if all the offsets allowed are available at no cost 
 to about $470 if a medium number of offsets are available at a higher price. As the economy 
meets the same target, the results for CO2 prices and energy composition do not change with 
different costs of offsets7. 
Table C3. Cost per Household (in dollars, discounted to 2010 at 4%) of H.R. 2454 with 
Offsets at Zero Cost or Starting a $15 per ton and increasing at 4%, Annual and 
Discounted to 2010 at 4%. 
Annual Discounted to 2010  
Zero Cost Starting at $15 Zero Cost Starting at $15 
  
Full 
Offsets 
Medium 
Offsets 
Full 
Offsets 
Medium 
Offsets 
Full 
Offsets 
Medium 
Offsets 
Full 
Offsets 
Medium 
Offsets 
2015 24 58 111 87 20 48 91 72
2020 187 299 330 357 127 202 223 241
2025 299 546 575 672 166 303 319 373
2030 408 962 1056 1185 186 439 482 541
2035 591 1324 1495 1650 222 497 561 619
2040 819 1726 1945 2171 253 532 600 669
2045 1093 2148 2492 2768 277 544 632 701
2050 1239 2420 2899 3245 258 504 604 676
Average  549 1122 1283 1428 182 371 424 469
C4. THE POLICY HORIZON AND OTHER UNCERTAINTIES 
 H.R. 2454 specifies a policy through 2050.  We assume full banking through 2050 but we 
assume no foresight beyond 2050.  Hence, the allowance bank at 2050 is zero. As we showed in 
the main report, depending on how economic agents look forward, or not, the near term results 
are affected.  We should also point out, however, that if the policy is adhered to through 2050 it 
seems likely it will be extended beyond that horizon, which could lead to a positive bank in 2050 
as agents see the extension coming.  If so, that would then require greater reductions and higher 
costs through 2050. Here the role of future technology is critical.  As shown in Gurgel et al. 
(2007) the existence of a known backstop in a forward looking model can lead to a lower near 
term cost.  Agents looking ahead realize that in NPV terms abatement will be less expensive, and 
so they delay abatement. An important aspect of these scenarios is that some near-backstop 
technologies such as nuclear (electricity) and biofuels (transportation) have not yet entered, and 
so they remain an unexploited abatement option as of 2050.  However, for these options to lead 
to lower near terms costs, there would have to be the ability to borrow, and that is restricted in 
H.R. 2454, requiring a substantial interest payment that would tend to offset any economic 
                                                 
7 Emissions, energy mix and carbon prices are different if the offsets cost is higher than the cost of abatement within 
covered sectors. Depending on relative costs, there will be a decreased (or zero) usage of offsets. In the scenario 
with full offsets starting at $15, the full amount of offsets is available but not used to the full degree. 
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 advantage of borrowing.  Thus, without consideration of the post-2050 period it is hard to say 
whether expectations of continuation of the policy would raise costs or leave them unchanged.   
 While it should be obvious, it is useful to emphasize that there are many uncertainties in 
estimates of this kind.  We have already noted the importance of the supply of offsets. 
Technology costs themselves are uncertain as is the rate of economic and emissions growth in 
the baseline. Additionally, though we believe their influence on costs is small, there are other 
provisions of the bill that we have not been able to include in the analysis.  
C5. COMPARISON TO OTHER ANALYSES OF H.R. 2454 
 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2009), the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 
2009) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 2009) also have conducted analyses of 
H.R. 2454.  The CBO focused on estimating the average household costs and reported numbers 
for 2020; the EIA applied its NEMS model to the task, and EPA utilized two different economic 
models. We could compare many different aspects of these model results, but since they all 
report an average household cost and carbon price, these provide a convenient basis for 
comparison. While average household cost is seemingly a well defined concept, there are some 
subtle differences in reported estimates.  
 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2009) reported a household cost just for 2020 and 
estimated it to be $175.  EIA calculates an undiscounted 2020 cost per household of $142 for the 
basic case and a range of $32 to $382 across all cases. The EPA 2020 undiscounted cost per 
household is $84 in one model and $105 in the other. Our estimate is $319 per household in 
2020.  We and the EPA analysis report costs in 2005 dollars and the EIA original estimate is in 
2007 dollars which we have converted to 2005 dollars. The CBO reported in 2010 dollars, 
undiscounted but reduced to reflect real GDP growth.8 The rationale for the CBO approach 
apparently was that households today would compare the expense to their income today, failing 
to realize that incomes were projected to grow. This convention essentially discounts the 2020 
estimate by the rate of growth of GDP. We reported costs, discounted to 2010 by 4%, and our 
estimate for 2020 in those terms is $215. EPA reports a net present value average annual 
household cost, as we do, which summarizes costs over the full horizon of the bill. Their 
estimate is $80 in one model and $111 in the other (EPA used a discount rate of 5%). The similar 
estimate from our EPPA model is about $400 ($250 in the scenario when the full amount of 
offsets is utilized). 
 We can also compare CO2 prices over time in the EPA and EIA analyses. EIA simulates the 
policy only to 2030, but assume a positive bank of allowances is held at the end of 2030 on 
expectation that the policy continue and costs would rise faster than their assumed discount rate. 
EIA’s CO2-e prices, converted from 2007 to 2005 dollars, are $34/tonCO2-e in 2020 and 
$69/tonCO2-e in 2030 for its basic case, and across all cases they range from $21 to $99 in 2020 
and $44 to $203 in 2030. In the EPA’s base analysis allowance costs start at $13 in 2015 and rise 
                                                 
8 We do not have CBO’s estimate of 2010 inflation and so could not convert these to 2005 dollars. 
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 to $70 in 2050, and they report an alternative scenario with different technology assumptions that 
increases the allowance price by 15%, and an alternative offset scenario that increases prices by 
89% relative to their base analysis. CBO reports a carbon price of $28 in 2020. EPPA’s prices 
for the H.R. 2454 medium offsets case are $26 in 2020 and $38 in 2030.  
C6. CONCLUSIONS 
H.R. 2454 would be an important step toward reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. We 
attempted to include several of the most important features of the bill including the Renewable 
Electricity Standard (RES) and provisions affecting CCS and coal generation.  We also explain 
the lower cost of H.R. 2454 compared to similar reductions in the main report as a result of the 
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 and the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009.  These two pieces of legislation included measures that would already reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, thereby lowering our estimate of the cost of H.R. 2454, but the total 
costs of climate policy is similar to those described in the main body of the MIT Joint Program 
report 173.  
An uncertainty in cost estimates of H.R. 2454 is the availability and price of offsets.  In our 
case with medium offsets, the CO2-e price starts at $21 per ton in 2015 and rises to $84 in 2050. 
The welfare cost rises to 1.45 percent in 2050, from about 0.1 percent in 2015.  The average cost 
per household in this case is about $70 in 2015, around $300 in 2020, and rises to $2700 in 2050. 
The net present value average annual cost for the period of 2012-2050, the horizon over which 
the policy is specified, is about $400. For different assumptions about the availability and cost of 
offsets, the cost per household ranges from as low as $180 if all the offsets allowed are available 
at no cost to about $470 if a medium number of offsets are available at a higher price.  
We find that nuclear, carbon capture and storage, and biofuels are less likely to make a major 
contribution to abatement over this period than we had estimated in previous studies of U.S. 
abatement costs.  Nuclear and CCS costs have risen substantially as plans to actually build plants 
have progressed.  As in the main report, we believe producing electricity with these technologies 
would cost 70 to 80% more than building a pulverized coal plant—the least expensive alternative 
if CO2 were not a concern.  Biofuel and biomass energy also appears less likely to be a good low 
CO2 alternative.  Recent analyses have highlighted the fact that a full life cycle accounting of 
greenhouse gas implications of even advanced cellulosic technologies may lead to greater 
emissions than fossil fuels at least in the near term. We have reflected this fact by raising 
substantially the cost of biofuels, and so it does not play a substantial role.  
Another important consideration in estimating the cost of H.R. 2454 is that under the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling in Massachusetts vs. EPA CO2 was found to be a pollutant, and therefore 
could require EPA regulation under the Clean Air Act.  H.R. 2454 would supersede such EPA 
regulations.  At this point it is unknown what EPA would require under this ruling but such 
regulations could be a costly way to reduce emissions.  An argument can therefore be made that 
H.R. 2454 should be compared against such an EPA regulatory approach, and the bill could be a 
more efficient way to achieve the emission reduction target. 
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The climate impacts of H.R. 2454 are difficult to assess as they depend on the efforts of the 
rest of the world, particularly, China and India. Our previous analyses show that failure to take 
any action, or failure to substantially involve the developing countries would lead to very 
substantial warming over the century (for the climate impacts of the scenarios with different 
participation by developed and developing countries, see Paltsev et al., 2007), but engaging 
developing countries might require large financial transfers (Jacoby et al., 2008). 
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 Table C4. Reference + EISA + ARRA  
  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
ECONOMY WIDE INDICATORS                     
Population (million) 296 310 326 341 357 374 390 406 422 439 
GDP (billion 2005$) 12614 13486 15696 17743 20056 22911 26192 29792 33810 38349 
% Change GDP from Reference 0.00 -0.11 -0.31 -0.40 -0.45 -0.46 -0.44 -0.42 -0.37 -0.33 
Market Consumption (billion 2005$) 8653 9192 10736 12006 13493 15384 17564 19959 22638 25665 
% Change Consumption from Reference 0.00 -0.11 -0.33 -0.44 -0.50 -0.52 -0.50 -0.48 -0.42 -0.37 
Welfare (billion 2005$) 10168 10813 12858 14524 16506 18957 21710 24690 28020 31795 
% Change Welfare from Reference (EV) 0.00 -0.09 -0.25 -0.35 -0.39 -0.40 -0.39 -0.37 -0.32 -0.28 
CO2-E Price (2005$/tCO2-e) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PRICES (index, 2005=1.00)                     
Petroleum Product (exclusive of carbon 
charge) 1.00 1.10 1.23 1.38 1.56 1.77 1.95 2.11 2.23 2.36 
Natural Gas (exclusive of carbon 
charge) 1.00 1.04 1.13 1.24 1.37 1.56 1.81 2.09 2.46 2.82 
Coal (exclusive of carbon charge) 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.07 1.09 1.12 1.15 1.18 1.22 
Electricity (inclusive of carbon charge) 1.00 1.09 1.28 1.33 1.40 1.46 1.49 1.50 1.52 1.54 
GHG EMISSIONS (mmt CO2-e)                     
GHG Emissions 7109.1 6895.5 7052.8 7141.0 7266.1 7567.4 8017.9 8551.4 9288.3 10075.3 
CO2 Emissions 5992.3 5841.5 5977.4 6060.8 6160.1 6425.5 6838.4 7328.3 8012.8 8733.1 
CH4 Emissions 588.9 546.8 549.3 545.1 541.8 547.0 550.9 557.4 565.3 577.0 
N2O Emissions  388.3 353.2 339.6 324.3 311.9 305.6 306.1 308.7 317.4 333.4 
Fluorinated Gases Emissions 140.6 155.0 187.4 211.7 253.4 290.3 323.6 358.2 393.9 433.0 
PRIMARY ENERGY USE (EJ)                     
Coal 22.8 21.6 22.0 22.1 22.9 24.7 27.1 29.6 32.4 35.3 
Petroleum Products  41.7 41.4 42.1 42.9 43.1 44.3 47.1 49.8 53.3 57.1 
Natural Gas 22.4 22.1 23.2 23.6 23.9 24.4 24.5 24.3 23.7 23.3 
Nuclear (primary energy eq) 9.3 9.1 8.8 8.6 8.3 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.7 
Hydro (primary energy eq) 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.1 
Renewable Elec. (primary energy eq) 0.0 2.1 3.4 3.8 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.9 5.1 5.4 
Biomass Liquids 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.6 3.6 4.2 4.1 4.3 4.2 4.2 
Total Primary Energy Use 99.3 99.3 104.7 106.5 108.9 112.9 118.3 123.7 129.5 136.0 
Reduced Use from Reference 0.0 -0.2 0.1 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.9 
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION (EJ) 
Coal w/o CCS 6.9 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.6 8.3 9.3 10.3 11.4 12.5 
Oil w/o CCS 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Gas w/o CCS 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Nuclear 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Hydro 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 
Renewables 0.0 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 
Gas with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coal with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total Electricity Production 13.2 13.6 14.3 14.6 15.3 16.2 17.3 18.5 19.8 21.1 
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 Table C5. Climate Policy including H.R. 2454 with Medium Offsets  
  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
ECONOMY WIDE INDICATORS                     
Population (million) 296 310 326 341 357 374 390 406 422 439 
GDP (billion 2005$) 12614 13486 15648 17646 19909 22679 25861 29348 33233 37648 
% Change GDP from Reference 0.00 -0.11 -0.62 -0.94 -1.17 -1.47 -1.70 -1.91 -2.07 -2.15 
Market Consumption (billion 2005$) 8653 9192 10715 11950 13396 15220 17325 19637 22224 25175 
% Change Consumption from Reference 0.00 -0.11 -0.52 -0.91 -1.21 -1.58 -1.86 -2.08 -2.24 -2.27 
Welfare (billion 2005$) 10168 10812 12849 14481 16425 18806 21492 24395 27634 31334 
% Change Welfare from Reference (EV) 0.00 -0.09 -0.32 -0.64 -0.89 -1.19 -1.39 -1.56 -1.70 -1.73 
CO2-E Price (2005$/tCO2-e) 0.00 0.00 21.31 25.92 31.54 38.37 46.68 56.80 69.10 84.07 
PRICES (index, 2005=1.00)                     
Petroleum Product (exclusive of carbon 
charge) 1.00 1.10 1.22 1.35 1.51 1.70 1.85 1.95 2.04 2.14 
Natural Gas (exclusive of carbon 
charge) 1.00 1.04 1.06 1.14 1.29 1.61 1.92 2.30 2.77 3.29 
Coal (exclusive of carbon charge) 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 
Electricity (inclusive of carbon charge) 1.00 1.09 1.46 1.55 1.62 1.68 1.80 1.93 2.09 2.26 
GHG EMISSIONS (mmt CO2-e)                     
GHG Emissions 7109.1 6897.0 5866.3 5575.1 5322.7 4994.5 4819.8 4746.8 4784.4 4843.7 
CO2 Emissions 5992.3 5842.9 5295.2 5033.0 4803.7 4502.4 4342.2 4275.9 4310.3 4360.8 
CH4 Emissions 588.9 546.8 335.2 325.7 313.6 296.1 286.8 282.1 282.2 285.3 
N2O Emissions  388.3 353.2 225.2 206.3 195.6 186.7 181.8 180.2 183.7 189.9 
Fluorinated Gases Emissions 140.6 155.0 11.2 10.6 10.3 9.9 9.5 9.1 8.6 8.2 
PRIMARY ENERGY USE (EJ)                     
Coal 22.8 21.6 18.0 15.5 13.3 9.1 7.8 7.5 7.6 8.0 
Petroleum Products  41.7 41.4 38.6 38.4 37.6 36.9 36.3 36.4 37.8 39.2 
Natural Gas 22.4 22.1 22.0 22.4 24.3 28.3 29.5 29.8 29.4 28.2 
Nuclear (primary energy eq) 9.3 9.1 8.6 8.2 7.8 7.7 7.3 7.0 6.9 7.1 
Hydro (primary energy eq) 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 3.0 
Renewable Elec. (primary energy eq) 0.0 2.1 3.4 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.6 5.1 5.4 
Biomass Liquids 0.0 0.0 2.3 3.2 4.7 6.3 8.6 10.5 11.4 12.1 
Total Primary Energy Use 99.3 99.3 96.0 95.2 94.8 95.8 96.8 98.8 101.1 103.1 
Reduced Use from Reference 0.0 -0.2 8.7 12.5 15.7 19.2 23.8 27.5 31.2 35.9 
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION (EJ) 
Coal w/o CCS 6.9 6.7 5.9 5.1 4.3 2.4 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.4 
Oil w/o CCS 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Gas w/o CCS 2.1 1.9 2.2 2.4 3.5 5.8 6.7 7.2 7.4 7.1 
Nuclear 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.2 
Hydro 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Renewables 0.0 0.7 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 
Gas with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coal with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 
Total Electricity Production 13.2 13.6 13.5 13.6 14.1 14.8 15.5 16.0 16.5 16.9 
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Table C6. Climate Policy including H.R. 2454 with Full Offsets  
  2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
ECONOMY WIDE INDICATORS                     
Population (million) 296 310 326 341 357 374 390 406 422 439 
GDP (billion 2005$) 12614 13486 15679 17692 19985 22813 26045 29581 33518 37983 
% Change GDP from Reference 0.00 -0.11 -0.42 -0.69 -0.80 -0.88 -1.00 -1.13 -1.23 -1.28 
Market Consumption (billion 2005$) 8653 9192 10720 11965 13432 15301 17443 19789 22414 25400 
% Change Consumption from Reference 0.00 -0.11 -0.47 -0.79 -0.95 -1.06 -1.19 -1.32 -1.40 -1.39 
Welfare (billion 2005$) 10168 10812 12846 14486 16448 18876 21593 24526 27796 31528 
% Change Welfare from Reference (EV) 0.00 -0.09 -0.35 -0.61 -0.75 -0.83 -0.93 -1.04 -1.12 -1.12 
CO2-E Price (2005$/tCO2-e) 0.00 0.00 7.27 8.85 10.76 13.09 15.93 19.38 23.58 28.69 
PRICES (index, 2005=1.00)                     
Petroleum Product (exclusive of carbon 
charge) 1.00 1.10 1.22 1.36 1.52 1.72 1.88 1.98 2.08 2.18 
Natural Gas (exclusive of carbon 
charge) 1.00 1.04 1.10 1.19 1.34 1.53 1.85 2.29 2.80 3.51 
Coal (exclusive of carbon charge) 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.04 
Electricity (inclusive of carbon charge) 1.00 1.09 1.35 1.45 1.49 1.57 1.67 1.79 1.92 2.11 
GHG EMISSIONS (mmt CO2-e)                     
GHG Emissions 7109.1 6897.0 6293.9 6094.1 6073.1 6167.7 6160.0 6031.6 6137.4 6093.2 
CO2 Emissions 5992.3 5842.9 5684.6 5511.2 5505.9 5607.9 5612.7 5494.8 5597.4 5550.5 
CH4 Emissions 588.9 546.8 360.8 353.2 346.7 345.7 336.6 328.2 327.2 324.0 
N2O Emissions  388.3 353.2 236.5 217.9 208.7 202.5 199.0 197.3 202.1 208.6 
Fluorinated Gases Emissions 140.6 155.0 12.6 12.3 12.2 12.1 12.1 11.7 11.2 10.6 
PRIMARY ENERGY USE (EJ)                     
Coal 22.8 21.6 20.0 17.8 17.1 17.0 15.1 13.3 13.0 12.3 
Petroleum Products  41.7 41.4 41.0 41.1 41.4 42.7 44.6 45.0 48.3 49.9 
Natural Gas 22.4 22.1 23.1 23.5 24.7 25.7 27.7 29.0 29.1 29.0 
Nuclear (primary energy eq) 9.3 9.1 8.7 8.4 8.0 7.6 7.3 6.9 6.6 6.2 
Hydro (primary energy eq) 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 
Renewable Elec. (primary energy eq) 0.0 2.1 3.3 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.5 4.4 
Biomass Liquids 0.0 0.0 2.1 3.1 3.9 4.3 4.7 7.2 7.0 8.5 
Total Primary Energy Use 99.3 99.3 101.2 101.6 102.7 104.9 107.0 108.8 111.3 113.2 
Reduced Use from Reference 0.0 -0.2 3.5 6.1 7.9 10.1 13.7 17.5 21.0 25.7 
ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION (EJ) 
Coal w/o CCS 6.9 6.7 6.4 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.2 
Oil w/o CCS 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Gas w/o CCS 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.8 3.3 4.5 5.7 6.2 6.8 
Nuclear 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 
Hydro 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 
Renewables 0.0 0.7 1.1 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 
Gas with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Coal with CCS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.4 
Total Electricity Production 13.2 13.6 14.0 14.1 14.8 15.5 16.3 17.0 17.6 18.0 
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